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C O V E R

I M A G E

Jefferson Barracks sat on a bluff overlooking the Mississippi River, and looked like this by the time of the Civil War. For
more on the role of Jefferson Barracks in creating the US Calvary, see Daniel Gonzales, “Courageous and Faithful: The
Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, 1833-1898.”
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4		 “Courageous and Faithful: The Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, 1833–
		1898”
		 By Daniel Gonzales
Daniel Gonzales examines the U.S. Calvary and its origins at Jefferson
Barracks, and suggests that its location and work in the nineteenth
century placed it at the center of westward expansion.
16		 “The Missouri Conservation Commision: Part I: The Need For It and
		 the Constitutional Amendment That Established It”
		 By Quinta Scott
In this first of two lavishly illustrated articles, Quinta Scott traces the
evolution of thinking in Missouri that led to the creation of the state
Conservation Commission and the influence of Aldo Leopold and Nash
Buckingham.
34		 “Cahokia and the Trans-Appalachian West in the American
		Revolution”
		 By Andrew Cooperman
The Battle of Fort San Carlos in 1780 was of great importance in
the Revolutionary War. Andrew Cooperman argues that a force of
Americans and Illinois French Creoles foiled British plans to sweep
through the Mississippi Valley.
46		 “Gateway Liberalism: Catholic and Jewish Responses to Racially
		 Transitioning Neighborhoods and Schools in St. Louis’ West End,
		1945–1960”
		 By Sarah Siegel
When St. Louis schools were desegregated starting with Catholic
schools in 1947 and St. Louis public schools after the Brown v. Topeka
Board of Education decision, not everyone supported the changes.
Sarah Siegel compares the responses to desegregation by Catholics and
Jews in the city’s west end.
67		 When Sleepy Hollow Came to St. Louis”
As part of a broader expedition, writer Washington Irving—whose
famous works include “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow” and “Rip
van Winkle”—visited St. Louis in 1832. He had lunch with explorer
and former territorial governor William Clark and saw Black Hawk
imprisoned at Jefferson Barracks. Here is his account.

The Confluence is a regional studies journal published by Lindenwood University and dedicated to the
diversity of ideas and disciplines of a liberal arts university. It is committed to the intersection of history,
art and architecture, design, science, social science, and public policy. Its articles are diverse by design.
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F R O M

T H E

E D I T O R

This issue of The Confluence is about turning points—those moments that represent a
critical change. In some cases, these are stories of capturing the moment when decisions
and actions transformed the region, while others are harbingers of change; they are
emblematic of broader changes nationally that played out in St. Louis.
Three of these articles point to sweeping changes in the American West. Andrew
Cooperman details the activities of George Rogers Clark and others in the Illinois
Country during the American War of Independence culminating with the Battle of Fort
San Carlos in St. Louis, suggesting that the victory in this region precluded the British
from holding the Mississippi River valley, possibly shaping political realities of the
region after the war.
Two more focus on the role of St. Louis in America’s Manifest Destiny. Daniel
Gonzales describes the critical role of the cavalry at Jefferson Barracks as a key tool in
American expansion into the western frontier between the Barracks’ founding and the end of the nineteenth century.
Washington Irving’s account of his brief visit to St. Louis in 1832 points to this expansion as well. He lunched with
noted explorer and Indian Commissioner William Clark at his country home, and pointedly asked him about York, the
slave Clark took with him to the Pacific as part of the Corps of Discovery. One cannot help but wonder what Clark
thought, being challenged about the status of York while surrounded by slaves serving the meal and catering to his
visitor’s needs. It is, therefore, the only account we have of what Clark thought happened to this fellow explorer. Irving
also saw the defeated Black Hawk in prison at Jefferson Barracks, who had defiantly resisted American expansion
onto Sauk and Fox land in northwestern Illinois. Black Hawk was exhibited to visitors like a zoo animal while at the
Barracks, then sent to Fortress Monroe and toured around eastern cities to convince him that resistance to American
expansion was pointless.
In the first of two articles, Quinta Scott examines the natural world of the region and birth of conservation in Missouri.
This beautifully illustrated article traces the thinking behind efforts to see the natural world as something worthy of
preservation and protection.
Finally, Sarah Siegel’s compelling research focuses on a critical period in St. Louis history in the late 1940s and early
1950s and the integration of schools. She examines sources that have received scant attention on the integration of
Catholic schools and, in the aftermath of the ruling in 1954, St. Louis Public Schools. By focusing the latter on Jewish
students and families at Soldan High School, she offers a unique comparative perspective on this key period. Her paper
is the recipient of the Tatom Award, which is given by the St. Louis Metropolitan Research Exchange for the best student
paper on a St. Louis topic.
These are compelling articles on timely topics. We hope you enjoy them.
Jeffrey Smith, PhD
Editor

And lastly, Lindenwood is undergoing great change with both President James Evans retiring and Provost Jann Weitzel
leaving to become president of Cottey College. Both have been strong supporters of this publication, and I want to thank
both for their support over the six years we’ve published The Confluence. We all wish them both the best in their new
endeavors; I know Jim will enjoy retirement, and that Jann will make a great contribution leading Cottey.
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COURAGEOUS
and Faithful

The Cavalry at Jefferson Barracks,
1 8 3 3 – 1 8 9 8

B Y

D A N I E L

G O N Z A L E S

Last Soldier of the Indian Wars at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)
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Courageous and Faithful: The Cavalry at
Jefferson Barracks, 1833–1897
The United States Cavalry was born at Jefferson
Barracks, and its purpose was to conquer the western
frontier. The men who joined became the vanguard of
manifest destiny and were witnesses as Native Americans
made their final struggle to preserve their way of life.
To understand how the western half of our nation came
to be, and a proud and ancient civilization was lost, we
must listen to the stories of those who served as United
States mounted troops. The men who served combined the
lessons of earlier dragoon and mounted ranger regiments
with the leadership of strong infantry officers. They
came from a variety of backgrounds. Members of the
U.S. dragoons were noted as “young men of respectable
families,” and some of the most influential military figures
of the nineteenth century, like Robert E. Lee, Jefferson
Davis, John Bell Hood, and Nathan Boone (son of Daniel
Boone), were included in their ranks. Most enlisted men,
however, came from more humble roots. They were
immigrants looking to find a path to the American dream,
ex-slaves who quickly discovered that “freedom” did not
mean freedom to work and live as equals, and men for
whom life had hit them hard and a dangerous job with low
pay on the edge of the frontier was the best path forward.
For a great number of these men, Jefferson Barracks was
the beginning of the journey. It was the site of organization
for the first unit of cavalry in the regular army, a mustering

point for the first buffalo soldiers, and the cavalry recruit
depot for the entire army during much of the Indian Wars.
Finally, throughout the nineteenth century, it was Jefferson
Barracks that stood at the heart of the network of forts that
spanned the ever-growing American frontier.

The Birth of American Cavalry
While short-lived mounted units were used beginning
in 1776, it wasn’t until 1833 that the first permanent unit
of cavalry in the United States Army was established. In
the early nineteenth century, the United States Congress
pursued policies based on the philosophy of manifest
destiny, or the belief in the divine right of the United
States to claim land as far west as California. The first unit
of permanent cavalry, the United States Dragoons, was
established to help accomplish that end.
In the years that followed, Jefferson Barracks was
selected as the site of organization for these early units
of mounted troops.1 The site was chosen, as Dragoon
Colonel Philip St. George Cooke explained, because it
was a central location for the units to be organized “after
a uniform system, before it was to be thrown into actual
service, operating in detached bodies among widely
scattered tribes of Indians.”2 The task assigned to these
early cavalrymen was monstrous. They numbered in the
hundreds, but were given the mission of patrolling a 1,000
mile frontier from Texas to Minnesota populated with
almost 200,000 native people and ever increasing numbers

Jefferson Barracks, c. 1841, from John Casper Wild, Valley of the Mississippi. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)

Spring/Summer 2015 | The Confluence | 5

of white settlers.3 In the 1830s and 40s the contributions
of the mounted troops in Oregon, California, Texas, and
beyond would expand United States territory by over a
third and serve as a guiding force for establishing law and
order in that new territory.4
The motivation to create the first unit of permanent
cavalry came as caravans of traders began moving
along the Santa Fe Trail. As they did, increasing conflict
developed with native populations. The current military,
made up of only infantry and artillery, proved inadequate
to patrol the growing frontier. Calls began as early as 1824
for Congress to act to protect United States citizens in
the western territories. Many argued that the only way to
do this was to authorize a mounted force. They remained
unwilling, however, as concern over a standing army and
the high cost of maintaining mounted troops remained.
In 1832, a Sac and Fox warrior named Black Hawk led a
band of warriors to reclaim land he felt was improperly
taken from his people in Illinois. The ensuing conflict,
known as the Black Hawk War, left Congress with no
choice but to act, and in 1833, after a failed experiment

with volunteer mounted rangers, it authorized the creation
of the U.S. Dragoons. The unit began formation at
Jefferson Barracks in August of 1833.5 Officers were
drawn from the regular army and those who had served
as mounted rangers.6 Recruits were drawn from around
the country to avoid sectional alliances, and described as
“athletic young men of decent character and breeding.”7
Despite the picturesque location of Jefferson Barracks
along a bluff above the Mississippi River, the dragoons
were unhappy. Poor quarters and a lack of equipment made
many question their decision to join the new unit. Adding
to frustrations was the fact that many new recruits had
been induced into joining with promises of fine uniforms,
ranking commensurate with cadets at West Point, and no
menial duties, none of which proved forthcoming. These
realities led to mass desertion and disorder. In order to
keep the unit from falling apart, harsh penalties were
introduced. Deserters could lose their citizenship, receive
50 lashes, or serve out the rest of their enlistment without
pay.8

This painting was made from a sketch done at Jefferson Barracks in 1832. In that year, Black Hawk and five other Sac and
Fox leaders were imprisoned at the post. He was escorted to Jefferson Barracks by Lieutenant Jefferson Davis. While here,
they were visited by author Washington Irving, who described them as “a forlorn crew, emaciated and dejected.” (Image:
National Gallery of Art)
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The 1st, 2nd, and the short-lived 3rd Dragoons served during the Mexican-American War between 1846 and 1848. This
image depicts the second major battle of that war at Resaca De La Palma, a dried-out river bed filled with dense trees. At
that battle, the 2nd Dragoons, led by Captain Charles A. May, led a botched charge against Mexican artillery. The unit was
redeemed when it was discovered that in the process they had captured the commander of the enemy line, General Rómolo
Diaz de la Vega. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)

Ultimately, the unit came together, and by 1837 the
Commander of the Western Department of the Army,
General Edmund Gaines, found them to be “in a state of
police and discipline reflecting the highest credit.”9 In the
years following the unit’s organization, they patrolled the
western frontier. Their “pomp and precision” intimidated
native tribes, allowing them to defend the west without a
single battle with Native Americans until 1846.10
With the outbreak of the bloodiest Indian War in United
States history, the Seminole War in Florida, and with the
U.S. Dragoons fully occupied in the West, a new regiment
designated the 2nd Dragoons was created. Authorized
by Congress on May 23, 1836, it was led by Colonel
David Emanuel Twiggs and Lieutenant Colonel William
Selby Harney. The regiment’s first five companies were
sent directly into conflict in Florida. The second half of
the unit reported to Jefferson Barracks for organization
and training.11 2nd Lieutenant William Gilpin described
Jefferson Barracks when he arrived as “the most beautiful
and pleasant Army station in the West.”12 In October of
1837, the 2nd Dragoons left Jefferson Barracks and rode
1,200 miles to the heart of the conflict where the training
of this new unit would be put to the test.13

Almost two decades later, in 1855, the 2nd Cavalry
Regiment would be organized at Jefferson Barracks,
dubbed “Jeff Davis’s Pets” because of the close
supervision Secretary of War Jefferson Davis gave the
unit. The unit’s leadership included some of the finest
officers of the time including Robert E. Lee and Albert
Sydney Johnston. Training of the unit went smoothly until
September of 1855 when an outbreak of cholera struck.
Some 22 troopers died and over 400 deserted in fear.
Miraculously, the unit was able to regroup, departing the
base the following month.
Created to manage the massively expanded frontier
following the Mexican War, they spend the years leading
up to the Civil War protecting the southern border of Texas
from Comanche and Kiowa warriors, who had proven
elusive as they were able to cross the border into Mexico
to avoid pursuit. When the Civil War broke out, the unit
like the nation, was divided. Officers served on both sides,
but a majority joined Jefferson Davis in the Confederacy.
Sixteen of the officers of the unit became generals during
the Civil War, more than any unit before or since has
produced in such a short period.14
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Colonel Henry Dodge served as the first commander
of the U.S. Dragoons. It was Lieutenant Colonel Stephen
Watts Kearny, however, who led instruction and training
of the new unit. Kearny took command as colonel in
1837 when Dodge retired to take on the governorship of
Wisconsin Territory. Kearny was described as “at all times
courteous, bland, approachable, and just, yet stern, fixed
and unwavering when his decisions were once formed.”
Kearny was a skilled and experienced instructor. In fact,
while instructing troops at Jefferson Barracks he was thrown
from his horse unfazed. He quickly instructed his troops
“obstacle—march” and the line passed around him like
water.
Kearny was promoted to general during the Mexican
American War and led the Army of the West in California.
After contracting malaria in Vera Cruz, General Kearny
returned to St. Louis where he died in 1848, just days
after the birth of his son, Stephen. (Image: Missouri History
Museum)

Fighting in the West
In the middle of the nineteenth century, migration west
increased dramatically as transportation options expanded
with the discovery of gold and other minable resources.15
This migration caused an increase in violence between
settlers and native tribes living on the plains. The violence
reached a fever pitch during the Civil War, as the regular
army largely abandoned the frontier. In the decades that
followed that bloody conflict, the regular army struggled
to quell the unrest caused by a civilization aware that it
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1st Dragoon Regiment dress uniform, 1833. (Image: St.
Louis County Parks)

Robert E. Lee, pictured here in his cavalry uniform, had
served at Jefferson Barracks earlier in his career as a
lieutenant with the Corps of Engineers in 1837. He
described it then as the “dirtiest place I was ever in.” It is
unclear if his opinion of the region had changed when he
returned as lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Cavalry, but given
the small number of commissions available in that period he
likely saw it as his only opportunity for promotion. (Image:
St. Louis County Parks)

was facing a fight for survival.16 Between 1866 and 1890,
there were over 400 individual fights between Native
American warriors and U.S. troops. Collectively, these
battles, skirmishes, and actions have been dubbed the
Indian Wars.17 They included fights with the Comanche
in Texas, the Apache in New Mexico, the Sioux in
Montana, and numerous other conflicts. Throughout this
tumultuous period, the U.S. Army struggled to adapt to
Native Americans’ unique and effective style of combat,
while also struggling against their own shortcomings in
manpower and training.18
Ultimately, the continuous flood of settlers combined
with the Army’s constant pursuit to drive Native
Americans onto reservations and pacify the West. Serving
in a chief role during this struggle were the recruits
trained in St. Louis and at Jefferson Barracks. St. Louis
became the principal Cavalry Recruit Depot for the entire
United States Army in 1870.19 Then in 1878, the depot
was transferred to Jefferson Barracks. Troops who came
Jefferson Barracks, 1883. This view of Jefferson Barracks shows much of what the post looked like while it served as the
Cavalry Recruit Depot. It is a steel engraving originally published in the History of St. Louis City and County by J. Thomas
Scharf. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)
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Recruits Leaving Jefferson Barracks Cavalry Recruit Depot,
January–December 1886. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)

U.S. Army Barracks at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. (Image:
St. Louis County Parks)

through the recruit depot to receive initial training and
supplies were distributed widely to every cavalry unit in
operation across the American West.20 The number of
troops who left Jefferson Barracks each year fluctuated,
but they averaged around 1,500 men.21
Recruits at Jefferson Barracks were assigned to one
of four companies of instruction. Each company shared
a barracks, which left the recruit completely without
privacy. Upon arrival they would be issued uniforms and
some supplies. Much of the recruit’s necessities had to be
purchased with his first month’s pay, which was a paltry
$7 a month, half of their normal pay. With the money left
over, some would visit local bars or bawdy houses, but
others would use it to buy decent food at local groceries
or restaurants, as the mess service at the depot was
notoriously bad, consisting of salt pork, fried mush, and
black coffee.22 While many aspects of service at the recruit
depot could be unpleasant, one recruit explained that “to
many of us enlistment was the best break in our lives. We

learned to walk gracefully across…the parade field…head
up, chest out, stomach in, arms close to the body, and not
swinging like pump handles.”23
The staff of the recruit depot was made up of officers
from each active regiment, veteran non-commissioned
officers, and a few re-enlisting privates. In the early
years staff did little training of recruits, who would stay
at the depot for just a few days or a month at the longest.
Instead, they would assign them to basic barracks duty
and task them with learning army discipline. The need for
recruits to be better prepared for service led to changes at
Jefferson Barracks in the 1880s, and a new program was
instituted where recruits would spend four months at the
base learning riding skills, the use of weapons, and basic
military doctrine. Frederick C. Kurtz, who enlisted in 1883
and served with the 8th Cavalry, described the training,
saying “[we] went through the usual recruiting service of
setting-up exercise [calisthenics], manual of arms, and
bareback riding around a bull ring conducted by that cockeyed drill sergeant you all perhaps remember, who used
not very polite language whenever one of us accidentally
fell off the horse or dropped a gun while drilling.”24
Once training of the recruits was complete, officers on
detached duty at Jefferson Barracks would then escort
troops in groups of as few as a dozen to as many as several
hundred out to their regular posts across the West.25
Jefferson Barracks played an important role in the
history of racial relations in the U.S. Army in this period.
In 1866, the peacetime expansion of the military, which
was necessary to address southern Reconstruction and
westward expansion, resulted in the creation of the first
African American units in the regular U.S. Army. Two of
these were cavalry regiments.26 With an initial pay of $13
a month, military service, while dangerous and difficult,
was one of the best breaks available to newly freed African
Americans, who found that freedom did not mean equal
opportunity.27

Stables at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. (Image: Missouri
History Museum)
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Nicknamed “Buffalo Soldiers” by the Cheyenne and
Comanche Indians, these African American regular
troops served with distinction across the western frontier.
Throughout most of the rest of the nineteenth century,
they maintained the highest rates of re-enlistment and the
lowest rates of desertion in the United States Army.28
While official organization was done elsewhere, both
units of African American cavalry would have early ties
to Jefferson Barracks. The 9th Cavalry Regiment would
make its headquarters in 1870, and the 10th’s first recruits
would join at the post in 1866. Beginning in 1878 all
new recruits for both units would pass through Jefferson
Barracks before joining their permanent regiments.29
African American troops would make up 20 percent of
the regular army during the Indian Wars, and they would
serve in vital conflicts from the capture of Geronimo to the
charge up San Juan Hill.30
While serving with distinction, African American troops
in the latter part of the nineteenth century faced deeply
embedded racial prejudice, but the shortage of troops in
the army during this period meant that discrimination in
the form of withholding equipment or supplies was rare.
Additionally, by the early 1880s, recruit units at Jefferson
Barracks were integrated. Whites and blacks trained
and lived side by side. At many other posts around the
country, troops of varying racial backgrounds served
together as well, and for the most part interactions were
peaceful. In January of 1888, however, racial tensions
exploded at Jefferson Barracks in one of the most serious
events of racial violence in the nation.31 Newspapers
of the time called it “A Soldiers’ Riot.” Problems arose
after an African American soldier was seen talking with a
young white girl and was thrown in the guardhouse. This
angered the other black troops, who then got in a fight with
some white recruits. Things escalated into a large brawl
involving knives, clubs, and rocks.32 In 1889, in reaction to
these events, recruit units at Jefferson Barracks were resegregated. Company A and C became white, Company B
became Irish, and Company D was designated for African
Americans and other races. This condition remained until
the Jefferson Barracks Cavalry Recruit Depot closed in
1894.33

The Dogs of War: Cavalry at the Turn of the
Century
As the nineteenth century came to an end, so did the
violent struggle between the United States and native
tribes for which the U.S. Cavalry had been created.34 At
Jefferson Barracks, the end of this era brought a real crisis.
The barracks buildings were in a state of disrepair from
the constant flow of recruits. Poor conditions meant high
levels of disease. Finally, the presence of both meant that
desertion reached disastrous levels. The calls for change
reached a fever pitch.35
In 1887, the Surgeon General of the U.S. Army declared
Jefferson Barracks “the most un-healthy military post in
the country.”36 As the decade went on, local newspapers
reported on murders, suicides, desertions, and epidemics.37

In January 1889, 2nd Lt. John J. Pershing, who would go on
to lead the American Expeditionary Force in France during
World War I, was at Jefferson Barracks preparing to lead
a group of thirty new recruits to join the 6th Cavalry in Fort
Wingate, New Mexico. Pershing would gain the nickname
“Blackjack” for his service with another unit of cavalry, the
African American 10th Regiment. He would serve with them
beginning in 1896, and lead them in the famous charge
up San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War. (Image:
Library of Congress)

All of this made St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter Frank
Woodward curious. What was really happening at the
old barracks? In 1889, he launched an investigation by
enlisting in the U.S. Cavalry. He spent almost two months
at the Recruit Depot before deserting and beginning a
series of articles on life at Jefferson Barracks. These
exposés would shock the nation with accusations of
embezzlement, abuse, false imprisonment, and even
murder. In reaction, Secretary of War Redford Proctor
ordered a full investigation, the results of which led to
better conditions and pay for the entire army. Additionally,
over the following years the barracks would be virtually
rebuilt.38
In 1894, the Cavalry Recruit Depot closed its doors.
The 3rd Cavalry, which had begun its life at Jefferson
Barracks in 1846 as the Regiment of Mounted Rifles,
returned to take over.39 Commanded by Lieutenant George
A. Purington, they would inherit an almost completely
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Color Lithograph of Jefferson Barracks by Gast Moeller and Company, c. 1866. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
4th Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, 1902. (Image: St. Louis
County Parks)
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Plan for proposed reconstruction at Jefferson Barracks,
1891. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)

new post. In the years that had passed from the 1889
exposé that shed light on the poor conditions at Jefferson
Barracks, new two story barracks, cavalry stables, officers’
quarters, and quartermaster quarters were all constructed.
In 1892, a bandstand was completed.40 This would
prove to be an important site during the tenure of the 3rd
Cavalry as its nationally known brass band would play for
local crowds there on Saturday afternoons.41 According to
one Tennessee reporter, “these regulars marched with an
ease and precision that caught every eye along the route,
while the sweetness and novelty of their quicksteps pleased
the ear already tired with a surfeit of Sousa music.”42
With the declaration of war against Spain on April 25,
1898, the United States launched itself onto the world stage
in a new way. By the end of the conflict in December of
1898, the United States would be a colonial power, taking
possession of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.
Fighting would continue however, as Filippinos sought
independence from their new colonial masters.43 This
conflict would see service by most regular army cavalry
regiments. Additionally, three volunteer cavalry, regiments
were formed. Only the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry
or the “Rough Riders,” would see combat service.44
This conflict would require a mobilization of troops from
Jefferson Barracks like it had never seen before. Missouri
would recruit more volunteers than almost any other
state, the majority of whom would pass through Jefferson
Barracks.45
With the completion of an electric rail line, large
patriotic crowds regularly visited the barracks to celebrate
the troops and their overseas mission. The largest of the
crowds was estimated to be almost 100,000 people.46
Several cavalry units would move in and out of the post
in this period, returning from or heading to service in Cuba
and the Philippines. The 3rd Cavalry left the post for Cuba
when the war broke out, serving honorably at the Battle of

3rd Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1896. (Image: St.
Louis County Parks)

Santiago and playing a key role in the capture of San Juan
Hill. The 6th Cavalry came to Jefferson Barracks in 1899,
but left shortly after for service in the Philippines. Finally,
the 5th Cavalry commanded Jefferson Barracks from 1900
to 1902.47

Conclusion
Even before the beginning of the Spanish-American
War, there were signs that changes were coming for the
cavalry service. In 1897, 23 members of the African
American 25th Infantry participated in an experiment.
They rode bicycles from Fort Mizzoula in Montana to
Jefferson Barracks. This trip of 1,900 miles was organized
as the Army looked to new technologies to move troops.
While many decried the experiment, believing that
“transporting soldiers by any means other than the horse
ran counter to...the cavalry’s feeling that an eternal bond
exists between a soldier and his steed,” others recognized
that industrialization was bringing with it necessary
changes in the way war would be waged.48
While the horse cavalry would remain in existence
until 1944, the ride of the 25th Infantry can be seen as a
foreshadowing of the mechanization of the cavalry that
would take place as the army entered the twentieth century.
From 1833 until the turn of the century, the story of the
United States Cavalry at Jefferson Barracks is the story of
the U.S. Cavalry nationally from its establishment until the
decline of the horse. It is the story of westward expansion,
and of the decline of Indian autonomy. Perhaps most of all
it is the story of the men and women who served, coming
from all walks of life and dedicating themselves for better
or worse to the monumental challenge of living up to
the spirit of the American Cavalry, the “Courageous and
Faithful.”

Man on horseback at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1897. (Image:
St. Louis County Parks)
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The Missouri Conservation Commission
Part I:
The need for it and the constitutional amendment that established it

B Y

Q U I N T A

S C O T T

(Editor’s Note: This is the first of two articles on the Missouri Conservation Commission. It details the state of
conservation in Missouri before 1937, the role Nash Buckingham played in getting the amendment on the 1936 ballot,
and how Aldo Leopold’s work in the early 1930s influenced the writing of the amendment and the direction of the new
commission and its early research. The second article will look at how biologists carried out their research for the new
science-based Missouri Conservation Commission.)
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Aldo Leopold and Nash Buckingham, the first

the Commission bill.” Buckingham responded that

a pioneer in land management for wildlife from

he and Matt Thomas of Knoxville had organized a

Wisconsin, the second a passionate and popular

statewide federation of sport hunters that helped push

nature writer and avid duck hunter from Tennessee:

the game commission bill through the Tennessee

both had a hand in pressing Missouri voters to pass

legislature in 1935. Buckingham emphasized that

the constitutional amendment that established an

“your bill must be right. The man you select for

independent conservation commission. Both were

executive secretary is all important.” He offered

well connected in the nascent field of conservation

to help Hoerr organize a federation, but he would

and land and game management. Leopold supplied

have to be replaced by a Missourian. Buckingham

the philosophical framework that guided the intent

traveled statewide, interviewing possible candidates,

of the constitutional amendment that established the

including E. Sidney Stephens, to head the organization

nonpolitical Missouri Conservation Commission as a

that became the Federation of Missouri Sportsmen.

science-based organization. Buckingham supplied the

Stephens accepted the job at a meeting of the group in

legwork. Buckingham loved ducks, he loved quail,

August 1935.1

and he loved shooting. He wrote for Field and Stream,

Buckingham and Leopold—along with members

Sports Afield, Outdoors, American Field, and others.

of the American Legion, the Isaak Walton League,

He had a following among sport hunters and fishers,

and dozens of Missouri sports hunters and fishers—

who were concerned about the decline in small game.

gathered signatures for the initiative petition that put

In April 1935, Roland Hoerr, a St. Louis

the constitutional amendment on the November 1936

industrialist and president of the Missouri Duck

ballot. The amendment passed, and the Missouri

Hunter’s Association, wrote Nash Buckingham asking

Conservation Commission opened for business in July

him for “information as to how the sportsmen of

1937.

Tennessee organized the State in order to put through

Whetstone Creek Conservation Area in Callaway County reflects the landscape early settlers found when they
came west into central Missouri north of the Missouri River. Prairies, pockmarked with ephemeral wetlands, covered
the flat landscape. Where clay underlay a thin layer of loess, it impeded drainage and flatwoods, treed in stumpy
oaks anchored in shallow soil, took root. Along the creeks and ephemeral drainages, woodlands grew in loamy
soils.
The settlers named the region Nine Mile Prairie. Nine Mile Prairie Township is 47,001 acres, of which 5,858
acres are in public use. Today, the Missouri Department of Conservation manages two refuges on the prairie, the
Whetstone Creek Conservation Area, which is open to the public, and the Prairie Fork Conservation Area, which is
set aside for research and not open to the public.
The Missouri Department of Conservation manages Whetstone Creek for Bobwhite quail and other small game.
The decline of Bobwhite quail and other game in the early twentieth century prompted the establishment of the
Federation of Missouri Sportsmen and the passage of the constitutional amendment that created the Missouri
Conservation Commission. (Image: Quinta Scott)
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In Missouri, deer, so plentiful in the twenty-first century that they verge on being pests, survived only in the southern Ozark
Counties in the 1930s. (Image: David Stoner, Missouri Department of Conservation)

The State of Game in 1937: The Need for
a Conservation Commission
For more than a century before Missouri passed its
constitutional amendment, its citizens broke the prairie and
cleared the land for row crops or pasture for livestock, cut
the forests for railroad ties or simply let them burn, drained
the swamps, and gave no thought to the maintenance of
wildlife. By the end of the nineteenth century, hunters had
killed or driven the last of the large mammals from the
state. During the period of settlement, 1800–1850, large
animals—antelope, buffalo, black bears, and panthers—
disappeared, killed for their meat or pelts, leaving only a
few individuals. Only deer survived, though in reduced
numbers. Badgers were gone by 1870, and passenger
pigeons were decimated and gone by 1890. Farm game–
quail, rabbit, skunk, and dove–thrived, at least for a while,
on the newly cleared agricultural lands, but as farmers
instituted modern agricultural methods, small game lost
habitat. Missourians had yet to take up hunting game for
sport, but market hunters had, for cash, not for sport.2
Concern over the amount of game market hunters took
from Missouri’s fields and forests led to the passage of its
first statewide game law in 1874. It was titled An Act for
the Preservation of Game, Animals, and Birds. The law
set open and closed seasons for game, including deer, wild
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turkey, and quail; forbad the netting of quail and prairie
chicken, save on a person’s own land or by permission of
the landowner; forbad the possession, purchase, sale, or
transportation of listed species during closed seasons; and
charged constables, marshals, market-masters, and police
to arrest all violators. The lawmakers made exceptions to
the rules: Farmers had permission to shoot any critter they
found eating their crops, fruit, or grapes. Any scientist who
wished to study a bird’s habits or history had permission to
kill it and stuff it. Market hunters ignored the law.
In the years following the passage of the 1874 act,
market hunting reached its peak. Market hunters
transported their kill to city markets on better roads. Their
city customers had no idea that Missouri’s wild game was
disappearing. While Missouri sport hunters did not take
up guns in great numbers until about 1920, when they
did, they added to the carnage. Game wardens had few
funds with which to carry out their duties. Market-masters
had a commercial interest in the continued flow of game.
Hence, the attitudes of constables, marshals, and police
charged with arresting violators reflected that of the rest
of the population.3 As yet, there was no demand for the
preservation of game.

Painted Rock Conservation Area, Osage County, Missouri
(Image: Quinta Scott)

Private Game Preserves
As early as 1877, private citizens from Jefferson City
leased land at Painted Rock on the Osage River. When the
owner of the land wanted to subdivide and sell the land
in 1907, a group of hunters organized the Painted Rock
Country Club, purchased all 1,086 acres, and opened
membership to dignitaries living in the state capitol.4
While everyday sport hunters may not have taken up
sport hunting en masse until about 1920, wealthy city
dwellers set up their own preserves for hunting and
fishing. In 1891, alarmed at the decimation of Missouri’s
deer, Moses Wetmore, president of Liggett and Meyers
Tobacco in St. Louis; George McCann, president of
Old Coon Tobacco in Springfield; and others formed a
corporation, the St. Louis Game Park and Agricultural
Company. They bought land in Taney County for a private
preserve, a game-park and resort, where they bred deer for
sport hunting and food. They also planned to mill timber;
grow grain, fruit, and farm produce; raise livestock; and
create a zoological preserve. In 1893, they fenced off
500 acres with an eight- to nine-foot deer-proof fence.
By 1896, they had amassed 5,000 acres on the west bank
of the White River near the tiny village of Mincy, which
they stocked with deer—native whitetails, reds, blacktails,
and fallows—to which they added Angora goats, elk from
Illinois, and dozens of Mongolian pheasants.

The St. Louis Game and Agricultural Company, Taney
County. Steep ridges, deep hollows, moderately sloping
uplands, cedar glades, oak-hickory-pine forests, creeks,
a sinkhole, and three miles of bank on the White River
characterized the game park. (Image: Quinta Scott)

The company built a hunting lodge on a bald
overlooking the river, installed deer on another 2,500 acres
behind a deer-proof fence, and opened for business in
November 1896. At a time when people in the Ozarks used
fire indiscriminately to clear pastureland and burn ticks
and chiggers, gamekeepers at the park used controlled
burns, one hillside at a time when weather conditions were
right, to maintain a fire line around the deer enclosure.
Both the Painted Rock Country Club and the St. Louis
Agricultural Park would be incorporated into the Missouri
Department of Conservation’s system of refuges in the
twentieth century.
Spring/Summer 2015 | The Confluence | 19

Walmsley Law
The work of private sport hunters at Painted Rock and
Mincy did nothing to quell the slaughter of wildlife by
market hunters, who sold close to four million pounds of
game, most of it illegal, in 1904. But by that year, sport
hunters outnumbered market hunters and demanded
changes in the laws governing hunting and fishing.5
In 1905, Missouri passed the Walmsley Law, which
continued open and closed seasons to manage hunting,
but enforced the law whimsically. At first the legislature
gave title to all fish and game to the state, provided for the
sale of hunting and fishing licenses, and allocated game
wardens $50,000 for a “game protection fund.” It looked
like a sound, comprehensive law, but two years later the
legislature gave title of fish and game back to land owners
and cut the appropriation for enforcement to $8,000.
Lawmakers gave title to game back to the state in 1909
and established the State Game and Fish Commission, but
they took away the annual appropriation for enforcement.
From henceforth, only the sale of hunting and fishing
licenses would fund the enforcement of game laws.
In 1917, Missouri recognized the need for public
recreation and passed the State Park Fund Act, which
allocated 5 percent of the funds collected from the sales
of licenses to the purchase and maintenance of state parks
on land that was well-watered and suitable for wildlife.
Big Spring State Park opened in 1924, and eight more
followed within a year, bringing 23,244 acres into public
ownership. At the end of World War I, the state purchased
or leased game farms that would function as refuges.
While lawmakers raised the allotment to 25 percent in
1925, the parks and game farms remained underfunded
and undeveloped.6

Big Spring State Park, Carter County (Image: Quinta Scott)
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Aldo Leopold’s Game Survey of the North
Central States
What happened in Missouri also happened in the
surrounding states: game lost out to the “axe, plow, cow,
fire, and gun,” the tools used to clear the landscape for
crops and pasture. Aldo Leopold used these words to
describe the disappearance of game from Midwest fields
and forests. A pioneer in wildlife conservation, Leopold
developed the concept of “wildlife-from-the-land,” or
land management for game, that would direct the work of
Missouri’s young Conservation Commission. In 1929 and
1930, he conducted a survey of game in the central and
northern Midwest for the Sporting Arms and Ammunition
Manufacturer’s Institute and published it in 1931 under the
title Game Survey of the North Central States. By the late
1920s, sport hunters, the buyers of guns and ammunition,
finally showed genuine alarm over the decimation of game
and furbearing animals. Just as Nash Buckingham would
enlist their help several years later in getting signatures
on the ballot initiative for the Constitutional Amendment
that established the Conservation Commission, Leopold
enlisted their help with the survey. In Missouri 129
people–members of the Isaak Walton League, game
wardens, foresters, sport hunters and anglers, and
academics–aided the effort. After he finished his survey,
he laid out his theory of land and game management in
Game Management, published in 1933, in which Leopold
proposed that wildlife could be restored through the
creative use of the same tools used to destroy it: “axe,
plow, cow, fire, and gun.”
In his Game Survey and Game Management, Leopold
recommended that nonpartisan conservation commissions
be established in the states he studied; that they have
members with staggered terms and free of political
influence; and that hunters and nonhunters alike—the
general public—share in the cost of wildlife, both game
and nongame, conservation.7
In the midst of the Great Depression, with income to
Missouri’s Game and Fish Commission declining, with
its personnel in constant flux, and with game depleted
and little money going into its replenishment, E. Sydney
Stephens and the Federation of Missouri Sportsmen
wanted to do just that: take conservation out of the hands
of politicians. They wrote a constitutional amendment to
create a conservation commission to protect and restore
the state’s fish, wildlife, and forests. Up until then,
political appointees had directed Missouri’s Game and
Fish Commission, the predecessor to the Conservation
Commission. Hence, policy and personnel could shift as
often as a new administration came into office, every four
years. As Leopold noted in his Game Survey, Missouri
employed the “‘game warden’ type” of conservation
department that relied “on an unstable executive
appointed by the governor.” Missouri’s Game and Fish
Commissioner managed six hatcheries and 36 wardens,
all reporting to three division chiefs; fourteen state parks,
which served as workable game refuges; and fourteen
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“The survey is financed
by the sporting arms and
ammunition industry.
The motive hardly requires
explanation: success in game
restoration means continuance
of the industry; failure in game
restoration means its shrinkage
and ultimate liquidation.”
—Aldo Leopold, 1931

wildlife refuges, which the state leased from farmers.
Game and Fish did not coordinate with the state’s other
conservation activities and exercised no regulatory power.
That was the province of the governor.
Stephens and his group wanted to put conservation and
restoration in the hands of professional game managers
who would operate under the direction of a nonpartisan
commission, in which each of its four members would
serve staggered six-year terms. His desire to remove the
conservation of Missouri’s game from politics extended to
the writing of the amendment. Allowing the legislature to
write such a law would leave it in the political arena and
open to future changes. Allowing the legislature to write
the amendment would take its wording out of Stephens’
hands. To that end, he established a committee of thirteen
directors, one from each congressional district, which
drafted the wording of the amendment. Because each
member of the new commission would serve a six-year
term, appointments would be staggered administration to
administration. The amendment would create a sciencebased agency with authority over Missouri’s wildlife,
fish, and forests.8 But few people understood the concept
of science-based management of wildlife. Here again,
Aldo Leopold fleshed out the idea that landscape could be
managed for the benefit of wildlife.
How the state handled wildlife conservation before and
after passage of the Walmsley Law hadn’t worked. When
Leopold performed his December 1929–January 1930
survey of wildlife in Missouri, he found rabbits abundant,
even though the rabbit meat industry in Missouri was
the largest in the region, but he found quail and prairie
chickens declining. He attributed their declines to the
plowing of the prairies for wheat and corn.

Bobwhite Quail Covey in Snow (Image: Missouri Department of Conservation)

Leopold did not develop his theories in a vacuum.
Shortly before he started his survey, Herbert L. Stoddard
published his seminal study of Bobwhite quail in the
longleaf pine and wiregrass ecosystem of Georgia’s
Red Hills, recognized as the first field study on land
management for wildlife.9 Stoddard documented the
quail’s food preferences: weed seeds, grain, and ground
cover that farmers despise; fruits, mast, and nuts from
trees; legumes; cultivated grains after harvest; and crickets,
grasshoppers, beetles, spiders, ants, or whatever insects
could be found on the ground or were within jumping
distance. Young quail eat mostly insects until they are
about three weeks old. During those three weeks they
gradually add seeds and grains to their diets until at three
weeks they are eating the same foods as their parents.
Much of their diet can be found in the cover they depend
on, thickets and vine tangles along fences and roadsides.
He documented their predators: Humans find them tasty.
So do hawks, skunks, raccoons, and snakes. Stoddard was
fifty years ahead of his time in his use of controlled burns
to manage wildlife habitat. Foresters and public agencies
in the 1920s and 1930s opposed their use. Stoddard
recommended fire to enhance the growth of quail food
and recognized that the quail could thrive at the edge
of the longleaf pine-wiregrass forest. To maintain the

edge, however, fire had to be used to control mid-story
underbrush and preserve an understory of the quail’s
favorite foods, grasses and legumes; to eliminate habitat
for quail predators; and to promote places for quail to
escape predators.10
In his chapter on Bobwhite quail in Game Survey,
Leopold described the four stages of landscape
development that led to the quail’s decline in the Midwest.
He guessed that during presettlement times, quail lived
at the edges of open woodlands that were maintained by
frequent fire.
As farmers settled the landscape, they brought “crude
agriculture,” characterized by “grain fields, civilized
seeds, and rail fences,” along which weeds and vines grew
up. They cut the woods, left “brushy stump lots,” and
added “Osage orange (Maclura pomifera) hedges to the
quail environment.” In short, they may have changed the
environment, but quail could thrive as farmers extended
their clearings to the edges of the woods.
Next, farmers replaced the weedy rail fences with wire,
cleared the stumps from the brushy woods for pasture,
and tore out the Osage orange hedges. Quail lost food
and cover. And, hunters began shooting quail instead of
trapping them. During the Great Depression of the 1930s,
farmers allowed marginal fields to revert to brush, weeds,
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Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: In Callaway County, where Nathan Boone, son of Daniel, surveyed Boone’s Lick Trail
in 1815, and his cousin, Samuel Boone, purchased land and settled on the southeastern edge of Nine Mile Prairie in 1818.
They arrived as settlers and hunted and trapped the prairies, which they looked upon as wet, marshy, bug infested, and
dangerous, worthless for any agricultural activity other than grazing. Instead, they settled in timber along the creeks, where
they found wood and water, and they tilled only at the very edges of the prairies. (Image: Quinta Scott)

and vines. Quail found food and cover, but good roads
increased population. Hunters with more leisure time
and better guns and ammunition offset the reversion of
marginal lands. Finally, hunters realized that quail had
become a finite resource and demanded conservation
measures and the introduction of pen-raised birds or birds
imported from other countries.
In his study of the decline of quail in Missouri, Leopold
offered as an example the history of a farm on Nine Mile
Prairie, where Boone’s Lick Trail marked the northern
boundary of the farm. In 1923, the farmer Phil Smith
restored a grain farm, using modern agricultural standards.
The land was half in timber and had never been grazed.
He cleared brush from the fence lines and out of the
gullies, which he filled. He cut the Osage hedgerows
and converted brushy woodland to pasture, where his
livestock could graze. According to modern methods, he
rotated his crops to conserve the fertility of the soil, and he
loved quail and hunted them. He counted 210 quail on his
property in 1923. Within seven years of clearing his land
and introducing modern agricultural techniques, ninety
quail remained. He thought he had shot too many. Leopold
concluded that the very farm improvements had reduced
the quail’s numbers, because the bird lost food and cover.11
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In developing his management plan for quail, Leopold
focused on open and closed seasons, particularly in
Missouri’s fledgling system of refuges, located in ten
Ozark counties. Even given a ten-mile zone surrounding
each refuge, he concluded that none of Missouri’s refuges
would have enough acreage to sustain healthy populations
of quail, particularly for hunting and trapping. Refuges
would have to be restocked with quail raised in pens. In
determining the allowable kill in refuges, whether public
or private, Stoddard had noted that killing 33 percent
of the population was safe. The kill rate, which seldom
acknowledged the number of birds crippled, could be
higher on well-managed lands, but 50 percent was too
high. Finally, Leopold encouraged managers and hunters
to think of population growth or the productivity of the
crop and kill rates in terms of numbers per acre, be it
quail, turkey, or deer.12

Nine Mile Prairie: Weeds, trees, and vines along a roadside and between cultivated fields, Callaway County, Missouri.
(Image: Quinta Scott)
Nine Mile Prairie Farm cultivated to the edge of the road with little cover on the roadside or between fields. (Image: Quinta
Scott)
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Aldo Leopold’s Sketch of Improvements to the Smith Farm, Callaway County, Missouri.
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Prarie Fork Conservation Area, Callaway County, Missouri (Image: Quinta Scott)

The Prairie Fork Conservation Area is no more than a
half-mile down the road from the Smith Farm. In 1997,
Ted and Pat Jones donated 711 acres of farmland near
their home in Williamsburg to the Missouri Department
of Conservation. Most of the region around the refuge
is devoted to row crops or livestock grazing. The MDC
is restoring the fields to prairie, using a combination of
applications of herbicides and controlled burns, followed
by the planting of native grasses and forbs, food for quail
and other small game. The area is not open to public use,
but is reserved for education and research into the role of
soils and water in conservation.
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Fall Turkeys (Image: Missouri Department of Conservation)

Management of Turkey and Deer
When Leopold finished examining quail and other small
game birds—pheasant, Hungarian partridge, ruffed grouse,
and prairie chickens—he turned to big game, including
turkey and deer. Northern Missouri had seen its last
turkey in 1895. Southern Missouri had the only remaining
turkey range in the states he studied. First, he numbered
the turkeys found in southern Missouri—4,024 in 1925
and 7,000 in 1927. Then, he outlined a turkey study: trap
and band all turkeys found in refuges to determine the
best cover for turkeys, the best food at every season, the
diseases and parasites that affect turkeys, the predators that
kill turkeys or rob their nests, how turkeys avoid predators,
the ratio of males to females, and how many males must be
around to maintain or increase the population.13
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Finished with turkeys, Leopold turned to deer.
While northern Missouri had seen its last deer in 1884,
Missouri counted 564 deer spread out across 24 southern
Missouri counties in 1926. Leopold noted that that was
an underestimate because Missouri had planted 300 in
five state parks since then. Because there were so many
unanswered questions about deer management, such as
how to gauge the age of a deer, he laid out a similar, if less
specific, outline for the study of deer. He addressed many
of his recommendations to the northern states around the
Great Lakes, where deer were losing winter cover and
food as logging companies cut cedar swamps for posts and
pulpwood, but where deer formed herds in the winter and
searched out cedar plantations for both food and cover. As
for Missouri, he noted that the state had a series of game
refuges, where hunting seasons could be set.14

Leopold’s Recommendations for Land
and Game Management
Leopold concluded his survey with a series of
recommendations for land management: bring as much
land as possible into public ownership as funds are
available and with attention to game management,
forestry, watershed protection, and recreation. (Here,
he noted that Missourians offered the most resistance
to public ownership of land, even though Missouri
had a system of state parks and refuges.) Make
game management a public/private effort. Protect
private landowners from irresponsible hunters and
compensate them for preserving game. Train foresters
and game wardens in research, management, and the
administration of conservation agencies. Do the research
in land management that will make game abundant in
the wild. Recognize that everyone, hunters and nonhunters alike, is responsible for conservation. Pay for
conservation not only through licenses for sport hunters
and fishers, but through taxes on all citizens. Beg for
private funds, if necessary, to educate the public and to
do the scientific research.15
Leopold fleshed out all these recommendations

in Game Management two years later, in which he
defined game management as “the art of producing
sustained crops of game for recreational use,” game
administration as “the art of governing the practice of
game management,” and game policy as “the plan of
administration adopted by government.”
He outlined the tools for managing the land for game
and game itself: control hunting, historically the first
technique of game management, by setting bag limits.
Echoing Stoddard’s work on quail, managers had to be
able to measure the breeding rates for individual species
against its kill ratios: How many turkeys or deer could
hunters kill or cripple while leaving enough animals
in the wild to maintain and increase their populations?
Recognize that landowners are also custodians of the
state’s game and let them be compensated for the game
that hunters kill on their lands. Help them understand
that game is a crop. Train them to employ the tools they
use to raise row crops to cultivate food and cover for
wildlife. Cover functions as shelter from the sun, as
escape from predators, as nesting places, as material for
nesting from the previous year, as a place to loaf, and as
food. Modern agriculture destroys cover and food, but
doesn’t have to if plants that supply game with food and
cover are left to grow along fences or between fields.

Smith Farm, 2015. A weed-filled gully runs through a soybean field edged with trees, vines, and grasses along the
roadside, all food and cover for quail. This field is at the site of the farm Aldo Leopold used as an illustration in his
1930 Game Survey. (Image: Quinta Scott)
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Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: Sunflower Winter Food Plot. (Image: Quinta Scott)

Beyond that, create refuges that are closed to hunting.
Leopold saw the refuge as a sanctuary, a breeding ground,
and a place that creates such an abundance of game
that the excess population can flow out and restock its
surrounding region. A refuge must be an integral part of its
region, and its region must be suitable to individual species
the refuge addresses. Leopold separated parks—dedicated
to game, natural attractions, and recreation—from refuges,
dedicated to restocking species in the surrounding area.
In parks, excess population growth of game can lead to
incidental restocking, an unintended plus.
Increase game by controlling predators, by providing
game with cover, by improving food sources for prey, by
understanding alternative food sources for predators, and
by using predators to prey on other predators.

Just as game managers had to learn the food preferences
of predators, they had to learn food and water preferences
of individual species of game. What do turkeys or quail eat
at each stage in life? What would they find in each season
of the year? What tastes good? What are they accustomed
to and how do they find it? Do they need supplemental
food in the winter? What kind? Managers had to have a
similar understanding about water. Doves and turkeys
drink water from running creeks or quiet ponds. So do
deer. Quails, partridges, pheasants, and grouse depend on
dew. Big game and rodents munch on plants for water,
what Leopold called “succulence.” Leopold concluded that
refuge managers had to supply food plots and ponds to
supplement food and water.16

Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: Wildlife Pond and Cover. (Image: Quinta Scott)
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Pittman-Robertson Act of 1937

Missouri’s Game Survey

Even before he completed his Game Survey, Leopold
attended the Seventeenth American Game Conference
in December 1930, where he and others laid out the
American Game Policy, an acknowledgment that current
conservation efforts were not working anywhere.
The policy declared that wildlife management be
developed into a profession, that scientifically trained
personnel direct wildlife restoration, and that a stable
funding mechanism for restoration be developed.
Carl Shoemaker, a special investigator for the U.S.
Senate Special Committee on Conservation of Wildlife
Resources, turned the conservationists’ policy proposals
into the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act
of 1937, which granted funds to state fish and wildlife
agencies for restoration projects through the Federal
Aid to Wildlife Program. Funding came through user
fees on the purchase of firearms, ammunition, and
archery equipment. The newly independent Missouri
Conservation Commission would use Pittman-Robertson
funds to hire scientifically trained personnel—
biologists—in its effort to build its wildlife restoration
program.17

The publication of Leopold’s game survey in 1931
prompted the states to conduct surveys of their own. In
1934, Dr. Rudolf Bennitt, a biologist at the University
of Missouri, and his student, Werner O. Nagel, followed
with a more specific Survey of Resident Game and
Furbearers in Missouri. They identified fewer than
100 ruffed grouse, not more than 2,000 deer, and about
3,500 wild turkeys. In addition, they noted that quail and
rabbits were declining along with raccoons, muskrats,
and mink. They took no census of fish, but severe
drought and wild fires in abused forests, where eroded
soils slipped down steep hillsides to muddy streams, led
to the decline of the state’s fisheries. Bennitt and Nagel’s
conclusions echoed Leopold’s: game restoration and
management depended on professional administration,
scientific research, trained professional foresters and
game managers, and an educated public that understood
its role in conservation. This would be the job of a new
Conservation Commission. Bennitt and Nagel published
their survey in 1937.18

Caney Mountain Conservation Area, Ozark County (Image: Quinta Scott)
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CAHOKIA
and the

TRANS-APPALACHIAN WEST
in the

American Revolution
B Y

A N D R E W

C O O P E R M A N

The American Revolution is typically viewed as

important. For it was at Cahokia that George Rogers Clark

primarily an East Coast affair, fought between Americans

and his mixed force of Anglo-American frontiersmen and

and their French allies on the one hand, and the British and

Illinois French destroyed British plans for a sweep through

their German mercenaries on the other. Certainly, the war

the Mississippi Valley. It was American military control

fought in the East was critical to the creation and survival

of the trans-Appalachian West, tenuous though it was,

of the United States. But it was the war fought in the West

combined with the skill and perseverance of American

that was critical to the growth and development of the

negotiators in Paris, which enabled the newborn United

new republic. In the trans-Appalachian West, Americans

States to set its western border on the Mississippi River

fought alongside the Spanish while the British employed

instead of the Appalachian Mountains.1

warriors from various tribes of First Nations. These armies

Like the battle itself, the importance of the Village of

were much smaller than their eastern counterparts, and so

Cahokia to the Patriot cause and the Allied war effort in

too were the battles that they fought. Nevertheless, in the

the West is little known. But it was at Cahokia that Clark

West as in the East, Americans acting in conjunction with

negotiated precious months of peace with regional First

a major European power fought battles that determined the

Nations. It was Cahokia that served as both a shield for

future of the United States and the American people.

defense and a staging area for offense. It was Cahokia that

One such battle was fought in St. Louis and Cahokia

served as the link between the Americans and their Spanish

on May 26, 1780, and while the Battle of Fort San Carlos

allies. And it was at Cahokia that a trans-Appalachian

is little known outside this area, it was tremendously

America was secured.

This 1818 map by John Melish shows St. Louis in the context of Alton, Carondelet, and Cahokia, suggesting the region as
Clark knew it. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
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Cahokia
Cahokia was founded by the Seminary Priests of the
Foreign Mission of Quebec in January of 1699. It was the
first permanent French settlement in the Mid-Mississippi
Valley, and today it is the oldest town on the Mississippi
River. The Seminary Priests came to preach the gospel
to the Cahokia and Tamaroa Indians, members of the
Illiniwek Confederacy. Over time the priests were joined
by fur traders and farmers. Close to the mouths of the
Missouri and Illinois rivers, Cahokia was an excellent
location for the fur trade, and the fertile valley in which
it lay, eventually known as the American Bottoms, made
Cahokia ideal for farming. Joining the Illiniwek and the
French Canadians were enslaved Africans.2
This mixed community suffered a double blow in
the mid-1760s. First, as a result of the French and Indian
War, France ceded much of her North American empire,
including the Illinois Country, in 1763. Cahokia was
now a possession of England, the ancient enemy of the
Gallic people. England was also a Protestant nation, often
hostile to Catholicism and Catholics. The priests sold their
property in Cahokia and crossed the Mississippi River to
what had become Spanish Upper Louisiana. They were
soon followed by many other residents of Cahokia, all
seeking refuge in the territory of Catholic Spain.3
The second blow came when Pierre Leclede and
Auguste Chouteau founded a fur trading post almost
directly across the Mississippi River from Cahokia in
February of 1764. St. Louis almost immediately ended
Cahokia’s role in the fur trade. No longer an active
Catholic mission or a center of the fur trade, Cahokia
became primarily an agricultural community. This was the
town that Capt. Joseph Bowman and his 30 mounted “Big
Knives” entered on July 6, 1778.

George Rogers Clark
& The Western Campaign
Bowman and his men were part of the small army
raised by George Rogers Clark in 1778 to fight the
British and their Indian allies primarily in the Mississippi,
Wabash, and Ohio River Valleys. Their mission was to
seize control of strategic locations and thereby thwart raids
into Kentucky. Clark firmly believed that the very survival
of the Kentucky settlements depended on offensive rather
than defensive action. The war had to be taken to the
enemy. But the authority and resources to raise such a
force and conduct such a campaign required the consent
and assistance of Virginia, of which Kentucky was then a
county.4
Clark left Kentucky in October of 1777 to appeal to
Virginia’s government to authorize and support his plan.
Clark was persuasive in large measure due to his extensive
cache of intelligence and his ability to connect Kentucky’s
interests with those of the rest of Virginia. Clark had
sent spies to the Illinois Country to ascertain British
strength, French sentiment, Indian intentions, and Spanish
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George Rogers Clark (1752–1818) was the second-oldest
brother of explorer and Missouri territorial governor William
Clark. As a Brigadier General in the Virginia militia, he
was the highest-ranking American officer in the Ohio Valley
during the War of Independence. Debts he incurred during
the war to supply his troops left his personal finances in ruins
for the rest of his life. George Catlin painted this miniature
portrait on ivory from an earlier portrait. (Image: Missouri
History Museum)

sympathies. What they learned and what Clark reported
to the Virginia government was encouraging. British
strength was based at Detroit, far to the north of Clark’s
immediate objectives in the Mississippi and Wabash River
Valleys. Further, they “had but little expectation of a visit
from us. . . .”5 The Illinois French in those areas were at
best lukewarm to the British and would likely support the
Patriot cause. The Indians were indeed intent on attacking
Kentucky. Lastly, the Spanish in St. Louis appeared
sympathetic to the Americans despite Spain’s official
neutrality.6
In addition to presenting actionable intelligence, Clark
also described how Virginia’s more easterly settlements
would be exposed to Indian attacks if the Kentucky
settlements were destroyed or abandoned. Britishsponsored Indian attacks on Kentucky had increased
sharply during 1777, and the Virginia county simply did
not have the resources to provide for its own defense. If
assistance from Williamsburg was not forthcoming, then
these western settlements would either be destroyed or
abandoned, leaving more easterly settlements open to
attack. It was therefore in Virginia’s interests to support her
most western county in its hour of need.
Clark presented his plan to Governor Patrick Henry

on December 10, 1777. Henry approved the plan, as did
Virginia’s Council, on January 2, 1778, while the General
Assembly authorized the creation of a force “to march
against and attack any of our western enemies.” Clark was
commissioned a lieutenant colonel in the Virginia regular
army (as opposed to militia) and given wide-ranging
discretion to conduct the campaign as he saw fit.7
Clark’s first objective was to actually raise an army.
Recruiting was somewhat less than successful, and Clark
eventually had to settle for a force of only 175 men
instead of the 350 to 500 he had originally envisioned.
Clark compensated for this by instilling a bit of military
discipline and rigorously training what troops he did
have. The small army, referred to as the “Big Knives”
by the First Nations and the Illinois French, left Corn
Island, future site of Louisville, on June 24, 1778. Its first
objective was the de facto capitol of the British Illinois
Country: Kaskaskia.
Clark captured Kaskaskia on the evening of July 4,
1778. Lacking a sizable army, Clark used speed, surprise,
and psychology to subdue the Illinois French residents
of the village. Clark’s use of psychology to first instill
fear of his men and then support for the Patriot cause was
masterful. The residents of Kaskaskia quickly and eagerly
joined Clark, Virginia, and the United States, taking a
loyalty oath on July 5. With Kaskaskia secure, Clark
ordered Capt. Bowman and a company of 30 mounted
men to ride north and take control of Prairie du Rocher, St.
Philippe, and Cahokia.8
Bowman and his men, joined by local Illinois French,
rode out of Kaskaskia on July 5. Both Prairie du Rocher
and St. Philippe fell quickly. Like Clark, Bowman used
speed and surprise to good effect. But he also had several
residents of Kaskaskia to vouch for his good intentions and
the Patriot cause. The residents of both Prairie du Rocher
and St. Philippe surrendered quickly and as Bowman
wrote, “were willing to comply with any terms I should
propose.”9
So it was that the Americans rode into Cahokia
on July 6. According to Bowman, “We rode up to
the commander’s house and demanded a surrender.
He accordingly surrendered himself, likewise all the
inhabitants of the place.” But whereas the residents
of Kaskaskia, Prairie du Rocher, and St. Philippe had
surrendered immediately and unconditionally, the people
of Cahokia were a bit more difficult for the Big Knives to
bend to their will. Bowman continues: “I then demanded
of them to take the oath of fidelity to the states, otherwise
I should treat them as enemies. They told me they would
give me an answer next morning.” Adding to Bowman’s
worries that first night, “there was a man in the town
who would call in one hundred and fifty Indians to his
assistance and cut me off. This fellow I took care to
secure; but we lay upon our arms the whole of the night. .
. .” Fortunately, Bowman and his men “took possession of
a strong stone house, well fortified for war,” and thus had a
secure place to lay upon their arms.10
The next morning, the villagers agreed to take the
oath of allegiance to Virginia and the United States, having

made their point by waiting some 12 hours to do so. Even
so, according to Clark, “some Individuals said that the
Town was given up too tamely. . . .”11 This was the first,
but by no means the last, time that the people of Cahokia
demonstrated an independent streak.
As commanding officer in Cahokia, Bowman was
responsible for both military and civilian affairs. His first
priority was to provide for the defense of the village. The
old ramshackle French fort that once stood where Village
Hall is today had been quickly replaced by the British
in 1765 by the stone rectory which stood in what is now
called the Cahokia Wedge. Like his British predecessors,
Bowman decided to use this “strong stone house” as a fort.
Repairs were made, and the building was christened Fort
Bowman, the Revolution’s westernmost American fort.
In addition, the local militia was mustered into American
service.12 Having settled military matters, Bowman turned
to civil affairs. He organized a local court, and he was
elected its first president. This court met in the home of
Francois Saucier; the building was later purchased by St.
Clair County to serve as the first county courthouse in
the first county of what became the State of Illinois. The
building still stands, and it is open to the public as the
Cahokia Courthouse State Historic Site.13
Most of the Illinois French had indeed swung to the
Patriot cause. Now Clark had to come to terms with the
various First Nations of the Mid-Mississippi Valley and
surrounding areas. Many of these tribes began to gather
at Cahokia to treat with Clark and his Big Knives. A
conference between Clark and the Indians at Cahokia was
organized in August. The location of these discussions
was more than likely near Fort Bowman. Indeed, we know
that many Indians were camped at the eastern end of the
Cahokia Wedge before and during their meetings with
Clark.14
Regardless of the exact location, the “amazing
number” of assembled Indians significantly outnumbered
Clark and his small force.15 Clark once again used
psychology to compensate for a lack of troops. The
American commander stressed that he was seeking neither
peace nor war, but instead desired to know which of the
two the Indians intended. He emphasized that he respected
them as men and as warriors, and as such expected them to
speak truthfully and live by whichever decision they made.
But he also emphasized that the British had misled the
Indians regarding both the Americans’ and London’s true
intentions. Clark maintained that Americans only wanted
the freedom to govern themselves, while the British were
using the various tribes to fight their war for them. Clark’s
credibility was supported by the Spanish. “The friendly
correspondence between the Spaniards and ourselves was
also much to our advantage, since everything the Indians
heard from them was favorable to us,” Clark wrote in his
memoir.16
This combination of bluff, bravado, respect, appeal to
self interest, and Spanish support worked. Despite a failed
attempt by some Indians to kidnap him, Clark’s conference
was a great success. During the five weeks he spent at
Cahokia, the American commander negotiated peace with
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The Revolutionary War in the trans-Appalachian West was marked by skirmishes between smaller forces and Native
Americans whom the British convinced to side with them against the Americans, as this map suggests. (Image: Albert
Bushnell, The American Nation, vol. 14, 1906)

at least ten of the First Nations that were represented there.
These peace agreements neutralized a large number of
potential British recruits.17 The local Illinois French largely
supported the Patriot cause, and now many Indians swore
peace and neutrality. Clark’s success with these two groups
was mirrored by his success with a third important player
in the Mid-Mississippi Valley: Spain.

Spanish-American Contacts & Relations
Clark’s intelligence from St. Louis proved accurate.
Local Spanish officials were indeed sympathetic to Clark
and his army. “Our friends, the Spanyards, [did] everything
in their power to convince me of their friendship,” Clark
wrote to a friend.18 This was especially true of the Spanish
Lt. Gov. Fernando de Leyba. Immediately following
Bowman’s successful occupation of Cahokia, de Leyba
sent him a message of congratulations and welcome. He
also wrote a similar letter to Clark in Kaskaskia. Clark
responded to de Leyba with a July 13 letter in which he
expressed his thanks and hope for continued friendship
between Americans and Spaniards: “Dear Sir, I received
your letter of the 8th Instant and with pleasure read the
contints wherein you expressed the deepest sentiments
of your real Friendship to me and the American Cause
a Friendship that is valuable to us. We have already
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Clark was known as the “Hannibal of the West” by the end
of the Revolutionary War, and he remained a heroic figure,
as is seen by his commemoration on this stamp marking the
150th anniversary of his victory at Vincennes. (Image: U.S.
Bureau of Engraving and Printing)

In this 1804 scene of St. Louis as it appeared from Illinois, Fort San Carlos can be seen in the center. (Image: Missouri
History Museum)

experienced it and hope to Merit a Continuation thereof.”
He was especially grateful for de Leyba’s “treatment to
Captain Bowman and Speaches to the Savages in favour of
us.”19
These letters were the beginning of an important
working relationship between the Americans and Spanish
in the Mid-Mississippi Valley. This relationship was
described in an April 23, 1779, letter from de Leyba to
Patrick Henry: “From the time that my friend Colonel
Clark arrived in this place, fraternal harmony has reigned
between the people from the United States and the
vassals of his Catholic Majesty.”20 And as Clark wrote
in his memoir, “Friendly correspondence which at once
commenced between the Spanish officers and ourselves
added much to the general tranquility and happiness.”21
This friendship was especially true of Clark and de Leyba
themselves. Clark was a frequent guest of de Leyba in
St. Louis, and a close working relationship between
the two was forged by these visits and a continuous
correspondence.
Spanish friendship though was also very much
based on Spanish interests. Even before Clark and his
army arrived in the Illinois Country, the Spanish were
considering their options vis-à-vis the British Empire.
The British had held Gibraltar since 1713, and they had
taken Majorca in the Mediterranean and Florida in North
America as a result of the late French and Indian War.
Spanish calculations in the Mississippi Valley were but
one part of a much larger Spanish strategy. The goal of
that strategy was to return those lost lands to Spain and
to expand Spain’s position in the Mississippi Valley.22
During the late 1770s and early 1780s, this goal meshed
reasonably well with the American goal of independence.
Bernardo de Galvez, Spanish Governor of Louisiana,
instructed de Leyba to assist Clark as much as possible,
but in secret. He also allowed Oliver Pollock, purchasing
agent for both the Continental Congress and Virginia
in New Orleans, to conduct his operations in Spanish
territory freely. Of course, neither act was in keeping with

Spain’s official position of neutrality.23
Clark’s ultimate goal was to take Detroit. It was the
most important British post in the West, and it served as a
garrison town, supply depot, and meeting place for British
officers and their Indian allies. Clark believed that if he
could take Detroit, he could largely neutralize British
efforts in the western theater of the war. However, Clark’s
plans for a strike at Detroit were subordinated to the need
to expel the British from Fort Sackville, which the British
had retaken in December of 1778. Clark’s expedition to
Vincennes included many Cahokia residents who were
eager to remove the British from Fort Sackville, and thus
remove a major threat to their community.
Once Vincennes was back in American hands, Clark
again planned an expedition against Detroit. As he did
before his move into the Illinois Country, Clark sought
to gather intelligence on the lands he intended to enter.
To that end, he ordered Capt. Godefroy Linctot to take
his company of Cahokia volunteers north and scout the
Illinois River Valley and beyond. In a June 1779 letter to
Linctot, Clark ordered him “to take Charge of a Volunteer
Company raised at Cahos and march by way of the Illinois
River to the British post Called Ome (on the Miami
River) which I make no doubt but that you can easily get
possession of by which Means you probably may be safe
while you have an opportunity of treating with the Indians
in that Quarter. . . .”24 Unfortunately for Clark, the British
were planning offensive operations of their own.

Battle of Ft. San Carlos
Spain’s entry into the war in 1779 added another
factor to British strategic planning in the transAppalachian West. While still a major European power,
Spain’s resources in this particular theater of the war
were quite limited. Very few troops from the Louisiana
Regiment were stationed in Upper Louisiana, leaving
defense primarily to local militia, and the Spanish fort at
the mouth of the Missouri River was literally falling down.
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Further, the Spanish had been assisting Clark and his men
since their arrival in 1778, but the official peace between
Great Britain and Spain had limited the British response.
Now, with war officially declared, the British could reduce
if not eliminate Spanish assistance to the rebels, as well as
force open the rich fur trade of the Missouri River Valley,
long closed to British traders by Spanish regulations.25
The attack on St. Louis and Cahokia was thus part of a
multipronged offensive planned to sweep through the
Mississippi Valley. The timing could not have been better
for the British or worse for the Allies. The British had
spent considerable time courting various First Nations,
and as a result they could recruit hundreds of warriors to
their colors. Conversely, Spanish and American forces
in the Mississippi Valley were weak and spread thinly
among various forts and settlements. Further, Clark was
preoccupied with building Fort Jefferson. Located on the
Mississippi River south of the Ohio, Clark planned to
concentrate what troops he did have at the new post once
it was complete. Both Spanish forces in St. Louis and
American forces in Cahokia would have to rely on local
Illinois French militia to flesh out their thin ranks.26
Further, the “Hard Winter” of 1779–1780 was the
most severe in years. Ice and snow covered much of the
country from the Great Lakes to Virginia. Game became
scarce, livestock died, and food stores dwindled. Both
civilians and soldiers suffered during these bitterly cold
months. The only benefit of this severe weather was that
it curtailed the military activities of the British and their
Indian allies.27
But while the British were relatively quiet in the West,
they were shifting their primary focus of the war in the
East to the southern states, including Virginia. This meant
that the Old Dominion had even fewer resources to send
west as it faced British troops in the east. In New Orleans,
Oliver Pollock had gone bankrupt trying to supply Clark,
and he could no longer support the small American force
in the Mississippi Valley. Clark’s army was cold and short
of supplies, and desertion was becoming a problem.28
Unhappily for the British, these advantages were
negated by one major disadvantage: the loss of the element
of surprise. Word of the impending attack reached St.
Louis and Cahokia long before the British attack force
arrived. This gave the Allies time to prepare their defenses.
Col. John Montgomery, American military commander
in the Illinois Country, responded to the situation
as best he could. In a May 15, 1780, letter to Clark,
Montgomery stated that “the Bad nues . . . Compelled
Me to March with out loss of Time to the asistance of the
inhabetents of Kaho. . . .” Luckily for Montgomery, his
small force included many “inhabetents of Kaho [w]ho
have Digtinguished them Selves More like Vetrons than
ondesiplened men and are Redy to turn out to a man to Go
Any Where the[y] are Requested.”29 Despite the skill and
reliability of his Cahokia militia, if Montgomery stood
a chance of successfully defending the village he would
have to be reinforced before the hammer fell. Some help
did come in early May when Capt. John Rogers arrived
with a company of mounted Virginians. Rogers and his
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Col. John Montgomery (c. 1750–1794) served with George
Rogers Clark in the Illinois Country in the War of American
Independence. Montgomery came by his revolutionary
credentials honestly; he was one of the 13 signers of the
Fincastle Resolutions, in which the elected representatives of
Fincastle County, Virginia Colony, told Virginia’s delegation
to the First Continental Congress of their support of breaking
with the British Crown in January 1775. (Image: Nashville
CivicScope)

men made repairs to Fort Bowman and “Put it in Some
Poster of Defence.”30
As the situation worsened, Cahokia appealed to
Clark, now a full colonel, for assistance. The Board of
Magistrates sent Charles Gratiot, a Swiss-born Cahokia
resident and prominent merchant, to present Clark with a
letter dated April 11 in which the magistrates explained the
village’s desperate situation: “We are on the eve of being
attacked in our village by considerable parties of savages
and will not be able to work at the cultivation of our
fields, if we do not have prompt succor. . . .” Their letter
also reflected the “Hard Winter” as they went on to write,
“but what afflicts us the most is this, that in case you send
us many men, we should not have the provisions which
would be necessary for them. . . .”31 One the signatories of
this letter was Pierre Martin, whose house still stands in
Prairie du Pont just south of Cahokia. In a May 11, 1780,
letter to Oliver Pollock, Clark reflected on the gravity of
the situation: “The Illenois Settlement are much threatened
by the British Gentlemen at Detroit. . . .”32
On May 15, Montgomery and Rogers crossed the

Mississippi from Cahokia to St. Louis to confer with de
Leyba on how to respond to the threat with a combined
and coherent strategy. Perhaps reflecting Clark’s tactical
thinking, Montgomery suggested that the Allies strike first.
De Leyba agreed, promising Spanish support for such a
campaign. However, the American delay in obtaining boats
and provisions for the expedition resulted in the attack on
St. Louis and Cahokia occurring before Montgomery was
able to move.33
The British force that attacked Cahokia and St. Louis
on May 26, 1780, was composed primarily of warriors
from various First Nations and commanded by Emmanuel
Hesse. In a February 17, 1780, letter to his superiors,
Michilimackinac Lt. Gov. Patrick Sinclair described
Hesse as “a Trader and a man of character (formerly in the
60th Regt). . . .”34 Thus Hesse was familiar with Britain’s
Indian allies and frontier warfare, and he was deemed
reliable. The Indians he commanded largely came from
the Sauk and Fox, Menominee, Winnebago, and Ojibwe
nations. Hesse and his force left Michilimackinac on
March 10 and moved south to Prairie du Chien. There
Hesse recruited more men. On May 2, Hesse and his force
of approximately 1,000 left Prairie du Chien and headed
south toward St. Louis and Cahokia.35
Both Montgomery and de Leyba sent dispatches to
Clark requesting that he leave Fort Jefferson and march
north to aid in the defense of Cahokia and St. Louis. Clark
arrived in Cahokia on May 25, and he immediately crossed
the Mississippi River to confer with de Leyba in St. Louis.
Afterwards, he returned to Cahokia to supervise its defense
against approximately 300 warriors led by Jean Marie
Ducharme.36
There is precious little in the primary sources which
describes the fighting at Cahokia. One such document
is a letter from Montgomery to the Honorable Board of
Commissioners for the Settlement of Western Accounts
dated February 22, 1783. In it, Montgomery gives a brief
description of events:
In the Spring of 1780, we were threatened with
an Invasion. Genl: Clark [promoted in 1781]
being informed of it Hurreyed his departure with
a small body of troops to the Falls of the mouth
of the Ohio, when he received other expresses
from the Spanish Comm’dts and myself, luckily
joined me at Cohos, time enough to save the
country from Impending ruin, as the Enimy
appeared in great force within twenty-four hours
after his arrival. Finding that they were likely to
be disappointed in their Design, they retired after
doing some mischief on the Span’h shore, . . .37
In a September 1780 letter, the Cahokians themselves
described how the Indians’ “slack manner of making war”
resulted in little “carnage in our country.”38
While Clark’s force and the residents of Cahokia did
not suffer the losses that St. Louis did, there were losses
nonetheless. According to a July 8, 1780, letter by Sinclair,
“The Rebels lost an officer and three men killed at the

Cahokias & five Prisoners.”39 With the fighting at Cahokia
and St. Louis over, the Indian force retreated north. The
Mississippi Valley component of the British offensive
collapsed. Soon, the entire offensive ground to a halt. Once
it had, Clark again turned his attention to Detroit. Included
in his calculations was the possible inclusion of Spanish
troops in such a campaign.

Spanish-American
Combined Operations
After successfully defending Cahokia, Clark returned
to Fort Jefferson. Before leaving, he issued orders to
Montgomery to counterattack the Indians who had just
attacked Cahokia. Specifically, Montgomery was to pursue
the retreating Indians, degrade that force when and where
possible, and destroy the primary Sauk and Fox towns.
Montgomery’s force of approximately 350 men contained
Cahokia militia as well as 100 Spanish troops, making this
an Allied offensive. The resulting Rock River Expedition
illustrated that Spanish and American commanders
could cooperate on offensive as well as on defensive
operations.40
Describing the expedition in a September 21, 1780,
letter to Augustin Mottin de la Balme, a former French
officer who claimed to act on behalf of the King of France,
the “Inhabitants of Cahokia” recounted the beginning of
the campaign: “Oh, Colonel Clark, affecting always to
desire our public welfare and under pretext of avenging
us, soon formed with us conjointly with the Spaniards a
party of more than three hundred men to go and attack in
their own village the savages who had come to our homes
to harass us, and after substituting Colonel Montgomery to
command in his place, he soon left us.”41
Montgomery wrote that after receiving his instructions
from Clark, he “immediately proceeded to the Business I
was order’d and march’d three hundred and fifty men to
the Lake open on the Illinois River, and from thence to the
Rock River, Destroying the Towns and crops proposed, the
Enimy not daring to fight. . . .”42
While Montgomery seemed satisfied with the
campaign’s outcome, the Cahokians’ experience in the
Rock River Expedition must have left something to be
desired. In the same letter to Mottin de la Balme quoted
above, the “Inhabitants of Cahokia” described in detail the
shortcomings of the Anglo-American forces: “It is then,
well to explain to you, sir, that the Virginians, who never
employed any principle of economy, have been the cause
by their lack of management and bad conduct, of the nonsuccess of the expedition and that our glorious projects
have failed through their fault: for the savages abandoned
their nearest villages, where we have been, and we were
forced to stop and not push on further, since we had almost
no more provisions, powder, balls, which the Virginians
had undertaken to furnish us.”43 This letter again illustrates
the independence of thought and opinion that characterized
the residents of Cahokia.
But the unsatisfactory experience with the Rock River
campaign, organized and commanded by Americans, did
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not deter Cahokians from cooperating with their neighbors
to the west. Spanish troops and Cahokia militia cooperated
in patrolling the areas north of Cahokia and St. Louis. In
August 1780, these patrols repulsed an Indian probe into
their area of operations.44
Cahokians also joined an expedition led by Mottin de
la Balme. The goal of his expedition north was to attack
Detroit. If Clark and his Virginians could not achieve
this, then perhaps this representative of the former mother
country could. Mottin de la Balme and his mixed force of
Illinois French and Indians got as far as the headwaters of
the Maumee River where the Frenchman and most of his
troops were killed by Miami warriors. Before his death,
Mottin de la Balme had detached a small force of Cahokia
French to attack the British post at St. Joseph, modern-day
Niles, Michigan. Their attack was successful, and the post
was destroyed. But the Cahokians themselves were then
attacked by a party of British traders and Potawatomi.
Only three of them returned home.45 This defeat moved
the residents of Cahokia to strike at St. Joseph once again.
However, the new expedition would include their allies
from across the river.
In St. Louis, Lt. Gov. Francisco Cruzat, who had
replaced the deceased de Leyba in September 1780,
authorized a Spanish expedition against St. Joseph.
He appointed Capt. Eugenio Pierra (Eugene Pourré) to
organize and command this campaign. Pierra raised a
mixed force of 65 Spanish militia, 60 Indians, and 20
Cahokia French. Pierra and his men left St. Louis on
January 2, 1781, and arrived at St. Joseph on the 12th. Only
a few British traders and Indians were present, and the
Spanish-led force had no difficulty taking the post. Pierra
and his men wasted little time in destroying St. Joseph
and returning to St. Louis.46 Ominously for the future of
Spanish-American relations, Pierra raised the Spanish flag
over the post and claimed the region for Spain.

Conclusion
Pierra’s action at St. Joseph foreshadowed over a
century of Spanish-American rivalry that stretched from
the Mississippi Valley to South America.47 However,
Spanish-American cooperation during the Revolutionary
War, especially at the Battle of Fort San Carlos, secured
the Northwest Territory and a Mississippi River boundary
for the new nation when peace finally came in 1783.
Clark’s successful campaign in the trans-Appalachian
West was in large part made possible by Spanish assistance
and cooperation. Like the French in the East, the Spanish
in the West were of critical importance in securing
American victory. Spanish supplies, Spanish troops, and
Spanish diplomatic support with the Indians not only
enabled Clark and his small army to successfully occupy
and defend the old French villages of Cahokia, Vincennes,
and Kaskaskia, but also to use them as staging areas to
strike at the British and their First Nation allies further
north.
Of particular importance to Clark was the financing
of his army and its operations. This was largely done by
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Oliver Pollock in New Orleans. Pollock used his personal
wealth as collateral for purchases of Spanish goods made
by Virginia and the United States. But it was Pollock’s
personal connections to Spanish officials, including
governors, which made these purchases possible. In an
April 22, 1788, letter to Pollock, William Heth stated:
“There is no circumstance of which I am more convinced
than that the conquest of the Illinois country could not
have been maintained by Virginia and that consequently
that it would not now form part of the United States
if it had not been for your assistance and very liberal
advances.”48 Heth was one of three commissioners
appointed to sort out the debts owed to New Orleans
merchants contracted by Pollock on behalf of Virginia
and Congress. Pollock’s personal wealth and connections
served Clark and the Patriot cause in the West extremely
well.
The role of Cahokia and its people in the western
theater of the Revolutionary War was also important.
Cahokia was the site of Clark’s Indian conference that
bought precious months of peace which enabled the
Americans to secure their position in the Illinois County.
The village’s location near St. Louis enabled American
commanders to maintain regular contact with their Spanish
allies. Officers stationed at Fort Bowman in Cahokia
were often in St. Louis conferring with their Spanish
counterparts. Cahokia’s location also made it an ideal spot
from which to launch operations to the north, and to act
as a shield for the villages further south. The people of
Cahokia themselves gave valuable service to the Patriot
cause and the Allied war effort by fighting in several
engagements and under a variety of commanders: the
American Clark, the Frenchman Mottin de la Balme, and
the Spaniard Pierra.
It was also at Cahokia, and St. Louis, that the
Americans, Spanish, and the Illinois French broke the
grand British offensive of 1780. The Battle of Fort San
Carlos left British operations in the West in shambles. The
war wound down and ended before another attempt could
be made to drive the Americans and the Spanish from the
Mississippi Valley. This in turn left Virginia and the United
States in possession of the lands between the Appalachian
Mountains and the Mississippi River. Though their actual
control of these lands was tenuous, Clark’s western
campaign and his defense of Cahokia on May 26, 1780,
gave the United States the ability to successfully press
its claims to this territory during peace negotiations with
the British. Virginia governor Benjamin Harrison testified
to this in a July 2, 1783, letter to Clark: “[M]y thanks
and those of my Council for the very great and singular
services you have rendered your Country, in wresting so
great and valuable a territory out of the hands of the British
Enemy, repelling the attacks of their savage allies, and
carrying on successful war in the heart of their country.”49
Thus, in conjunction with his Spanish allies and with the
aid of the village and people of Cahokia, George Rogers
Clark and his army of “Big Knives” secured an America
not bound to the Atlantic seaboard.
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Gateway Liberalism:
Catholic and Jewish Responses
to Racially Transitioning Neighborhoods
and Schools In St. Louis’s West End,
1945–1960
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S I E G E L

Joseph Ritter (1892–1967) had already taken action to
desegregate Catholic schools before he arrived in St. Louis
as archbishop in 1947. As the new Bishop of Indianapolis
in 1938, Ritter ordered that parochial schools no longer be
segregated, which met with opposition and protests from
groups as varied as the Ku Klux Klan and some clergy.
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)

Within the span of one year, two civil rights decisions,
one religious and one secular, signaled momentous shifts
in the racial and religious demographics of St. Louis’s
schools and neighborhoods. In the summer of 1947, St.
Louis’s newly arrived Cardinal Joseph Ritter announced
that the city and county’s Catholic high schools would
desegregate.1 A few months later, in January 1948, the
United States Supreme Court ruled racially restrictive
housing covenants illegal in the St. Louis–based Shelley
v. Kraemer case. For decades, racial covenants had forced
a growing black population to remain in overcrowded,
segregated neighborhoods, and as a result of the case,
blacks gradually moved into previously all-white
neighborhoods across the city and north county.
These two decisions, imposed upon St. Louisans by
authority figures, sparked rapid and intense demographic
change in schools and neighborhoods. The area most
affected by housing desegregation was the West End
neighborhood, a working- and middle-class community
located on the northwestern border of the city. In the
decade following these two decisions, the West End
specifically and St. Louis as a whole rose to be a model
of progressive race relations that quickly faltered. Buoyed
by an initially lauded school desegregation process, West

End activists worked hard to stabilize their neighborhood’s
interracial composition by publicizing the neighborhood
as a model of an integrated, desirable, middle-class
community.
As the decisions of 1947–1948 signaled clear change
in the city’s population patterns, a broad range of St.
Louisans exhibited optimism regarding the future of
race relations in the city. This confidence was especially
apparent in the way the city’s press portrayed St.
Louis’s response to the Brown v. Board public school
desegregation case. When the Brown decision was
announced in May 1954, local news articles distanced
the city from the turmoil the case caused in the South. On
the day of the court’s announcement, the St. Louis PostDispatch foresaw that the decision “will cause the most
radical upheaval in the South since reconstruction days,”
yet a day later, the city’s NAACP branch also correctly
predicted “that no difficulty will be experienced because
of integrated education [in St. Louis]. … All people have
a profound respect for the laws of the land.”2 Even though
the Brown case deemed Missouri’s school segregation laws
illegal alongside those of the South, the city reported the
decision as if residents were northern onlookers. In fact,
St. Louis’s newspapers usually took a nonchalant tone
regarding the city’s school desegregation to highlight its
lack of controversy. The press also declined to give much
publicity to anti-integration protest, choosing instead to
focus on the logistics of the desegregation plan. 3 The
Post-Dispatch, the Globe-Democrat, and the black-owned
Argus described the three desegregation phases planned by
the school board, announced each stage of implementation,
and reported the number black students who transferred
to each previously all-white school. They provided quotes
from school administrators who praised students for
adapting quickly to their new peers.4 Overall, Missouri’s
desegregation process received surprisingly little attention
from the press, and St. Louisans prided themselves on their
peaceful, law-abiding citizenry that seemed, for the most
part, accepting of progressive change.
Certainly, some ardent and vocal segregationists
expressed their anger at desegregation. Most notably,
an organization called the National Citizens Protective
Association organized briefly to express opposition to
the desegregation plan. Many others surely expressed
disapproval of segregation privately, and a minority of
parents instructed their children not to associate with
black classmates socially, telling their children to “just
act like [the black students] are not there.”5 But public
school desegregation plans in St. Louis were implemented
without violence or widespread opposition and with the
support of a variety of community institutions, especially
civil rights, interfaith, and neighborhood organizations.6
In some cases, parents organized to ease their children’s
schools’ integration. They expressed their enthusiasm
that desegregation strengthened the city’s commitment to
equality and democracy, and their views were accepted
as mainstream.7 At the time it was implemented in 1954–
1955, civil rights groups and liberal whites largely hailed
the integration process as a victory. Indeed, the St. Louis
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Board of Education had completed its desegregation plan
on schedule by September 1955, just over a year after the
Brown decision and two years before the federally forced
desegregation of Central High in Little Rock, Arkansas.
City leaders, school officials, residents, and news outlets
touted St. Louis as a law-abiding community willing to
actively facilitate, or at least passively accept, integration.
Despite this tranquil picture, the recently desegregated
schools and racially transitioning neighborhoods in St.
Louis fell prey to re-segregation within only a few years,
and this racial and economic segregation has persisted to
the present day. There were instances in the late fifties and
early sixties of the school board allowing white students to
attend white schools outside of their neighborhood districts
through loopholes and busing, but overall re-segregation
occurred due to racial change within city and county
neighborhoods. Less than ten years after this purported
triumph of school integration and racial progressivism,
school and neighborhood desegregation had all but
disappeared, and St. Louis became yet another example of
the devastating shortcomings of liberal racial policies.
Why did a city that acted so confidently to end legalized
school segregation overwhelmingly fail to sustain
integrated urban schools and neighborhoods? The answer
lies in the contradictions of liberalism, both in St. Louis
and throughout the country. Historian Robert Self defines
liberalism with four factors: a general commitment to
New Deal welfare institutions, the economic promotion
of the middle class, equality of opportunity for all races,
and individualism.8 As Self has explained, a central pitfall
of liberalism in the mid-twentieth century was that when
white liberals’ commitment to racial equality clashed
with their commitment to expanded opportunity for the
middle class, they almost always favored benefiting the
middle class to the detriment of black economic, political,
and housing opportunities. White liberals’ desire to live
and own property in upwardly mobile communities
ultimately trumped visions of interracial neighborhoods.
Self provides a crucial explanation for where goals
of liberalism fall apart, but it is necessary to analyze
local cases to understand why this breakdown of liberal
ideology occurred and what its consequences were.
Two distinct but related types of liberalism were present
in St. Louis, though both failed to create a coherent vision
of an urban community that was both integrated and
economically prosperous. A small but vocal cohort of
active liberals understood that maintaining an integrated
urban neighborhood would require individuals to make
housing choices based on a desire to foster an integrated
community. They understood that pursuing economic
advancement and racial integration simultaneously would
require a personal commitment. They joined interracial
neighborhood organizations with the goal of fostering an
integrated, economically stable neighborhood. As large
numbers of their neighbors disinvested in the city and
moved to the suburbs, however, active liberals realized that
their agenda would be incredibly difficult to implement.
Organizations that promoted neighborhood advancement
experienced interracial disagreements, inhibiting their
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moral authority. Further, active white liberals never had a
critical mass to influence demographic patterns. Despite a
more realistic understanding of what it would take to craft
an integrated neighborhood, active liberals were unable to
sustain an interracial community.
In addition to a small number of active liberals, the
majority of whites in the West End were what can be
called passive liberals: they believed in both economic
opportunity and racial equality, but were unwilling to take
any actions that would risk their financial security. To be a
passive liberal does not mean that these individuals were
unwilling to act; in fact, these individuals were quick to
leave the neighborhood when they sensed the possibility
of economic decline. These individuals assumed that an
influx of black residents would decrease property values,
and they chose to leave the West End (sometimes even
before blacks started moving into the neighborhood) rather
than risk living in a declining community. Passive liberals
could feel secure that their race-based decisions were not
racist because they espoused the rhetoric of racial equality.
The term “passive” therefore refers to the nature of their
commitment to liberalism: they believed that individuals
should not be responsible for personally participating in
residential desegregation. Passive liberalism could only
improve race relations when a community would endorse
policies that were becoming mainstream, as was the
case in St. Louis’s public school desegregation.9 Passive
liberalism failed to produce improvements for blacks when
whites perceived personal financial or social risks, seen
in whites’ housing choices in the late 1940s through the
1950s. While this passive liberalism may seem innocuous
on its surface, it had pernicious consequences that have
maintained economic and racial segregation into the
twenty-first century. Most insidious, as passive liberalism
became the mainstream in the West End, individuals
could espouse liberal rhetoric while justifying race-based
decisions about where to live and with whom to socialize.
To better understand racially transitioning
neighborhoods, urban scholars have examined the religious
influences within cities, which in many cases had profound
effects on urban policy and neighborhood demographics.
Attention to religious population patterns is especially
important in heavily Catholic St Louis and in the West
End, which had a large Jewish population. Even though
the character of liberalism was different for Catholics
and Jews, the effects of liberalism were similar on each
group’s housing choices. As evidenced by Cardinal
Ritter’s decision to desegregate parochial schools, Catholic
leadership in St. Louis proved much more actively liberal
than the general population. Parishioners therefore often
felt caught between their religious devotion to the Catholic
hierarchy and their social anxiety about living in close
proximity to blacks. This tension between mandates from
Catholic religious leaders and discomfort with integrated
communities translated into a grudging acceptance of
passive liberalism. It led to the existence of integrated
institutions and a simultaneous exodus into racially
homogenous suburbs.10 Even though Jewish laypeople
were more likely than Catholics to espouse liberal rhetoric,

The YMHA/YWHA sponsored a Liberal Forum in the 1940s and 1950s that featured a number of speakers who were
prominent nationally. Among those was Max Lerner (1902–1992), a Russian immigrant who became a popular journalist,
editor, and scholar. By the time he spoke at the Liberal Forum in St. Louis, he was well known for advocating rights for
African-Americans, as well as supporting internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. (Image: St. Louis Jewish
Community Archives)

most Jews’ commitments to racial equality and integration
were also passive—they were ultimately unwilling to take
any action that posed economic or social risk in order to
cultivate a desirable, integrated urban neighborhood.11
For Jews in the West End, the problem with liberalism
was a gap between rhetoric and action. Passive liberals
accepted desegregated institutions but proved unwilling
to commit to active pursuance of an integrated, desirable
neighborhood.
St. Louisans’ understanding of the necessity and
inevitability of school integration opened unique

opportunities for residents to lead integration, and many
of these efforts had religious influences. Despite efforts
by some religious and secular leaders, though, St. Louis
missed its opportunity for a truly integrated city because a
majority of passively liberal residents and religious leaders
could not reconcile their theoretical commitment to racial
equality with personal choices regarding where to live and
educate their children. Highlighting Catholic and Jewish
experiences with school and neighborhood desegregation
demonstrates these complex dynamics. Regardless of
who spearheaded campaigns to promote integration—
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Temple Israel was among the religious institutions at the “Holy Corners” area in the Central West End at the intersection of
Kingshighway and McPherson, and it was the synagogue for the large Jewish population in the West End. (Image: St. Louis
Jewish Community Archives)

institutionally based Catholic leaders, individual liberal
Jewish leaders, or secular interracial neighborhood
organizations—the results were similar: between 1945 and
1960, most whites moved out of neighborhoods that began
integrating after 1948.
St. Louis’s West End neighborhood typifies the city’s
racial transition and failed efforts to create stable, middleclass, integrated urban spaces. The West End is located
north of Forest Park, extending west to the city limits,
east to Kingshighway Boulevard, one of the city’s central
arteries, and north approximately to Natural Bridge Road.
The West End bordered African American residential
enclaves, making it a logical place for blacks to move
after the Shelley v. Kraemer decision. The neighborhood’s
Windemere Place was the first block of the city to
desegregate in the wake of the court decision.12 Individuals
who lived in the West End in the first half of the twentieth
century remember it fondly. Harvey Brown, a Jewish
West End resident from 1937–1950, explained, “it was a
wonderful place to grow up, and we had everything we
needed. . . . [W]e had so many places to go to play.”13
The West End was home to two Catholic parishes that
flourished during the early twentieth century: St. Rose of
Lima and St. Mark. Adjacent to the neighborhood lies the
Cathedral Basilica of St. Louis, the spiritual center of the
archdiocese of St. Louis. A variety of Jewish congregations
also inhabited the neighborhood through the first half
of the century. Most of these synagogues had relocated
to the West End from locations in or near downtown,
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following a population shift as the Jewish community
grew, prospered economically, and moved west. Even
though racial transition was occurring by the early fifties,
the West End still boasted at least fourteen separate Jewish
congregations in 1954.14 While many Catholic children
attended parochial schools, most Jews sent their children
to public school. Soldan High School (for a brief period
known as Soldan-Blewett), located on Union Boulevard in
the heart of the West End, housed a large Jewish student
body from its construction in 1909 until after World
War II and was a source of pride for the neighborhood.
In fact, Jewish alumnae and their families continue to
refer to the school and the prominent place it once had
for their community. Analyzing Catholic, Jewish, and
secular responses to school and neighborhood integration
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of St. Louis’s liberalism.
There is a very strong Catholic influence on the St.
Louis region. St. Louis today has a higher proportion of
Catholics attending parochial schools than any diocese
in the country.15 As Cardinal Joseph Ritter’s 1947 school
desegregation indicated, the liberal Catholic impulse
to embrace integrated schools and neighborhoods was
rooted in Catholic leadership and institutions. While some
Catholic St. Louisians supported school and neighborhood
integration, a large portion resented incoming blacks.
Clergy, recognizing that fixed parish boundaries would
suffer great population losses if white Catholics abandoned
their parishes, worked to convince white Catholics to
remain in their parishes and also sometimes to convert

blacks to Catholicism. These efforts, both to keep white
Catholics in the city and to convert blacks, were largely
unsuccessful. The post–World War II years witnessed a
substantial decline of the Catholic population in St. Louis
city, and many urban parishes—including those in and
near the West End—had to be closed or consolidated in
the late twentieth century due to a decreasing Catholic
population.
By the early twentieth century, the vast majority of
the Catholic population in St. Louis was white. Black
Catholics, whose population had French Creole roots,
worshiped in the segregated St. Elizabeth Parish, and
many sent their children to St. Joseph’s Colored High
School. However, Cardinal Ritter’s 1947 announcement
that all Catholic high schools would desegregate was
a reaction to the inadequate resources at St. Joseph’s.
His actively liberal proclamation provoked a variety of
responses from both Catholics and non-Catholics, and
correspondence poured into the Archdiocese from St.
Louis, across the country, and places as remote as Mexico
and Bangalore. The vast majority of the letters—402
out of 479—expressed approval of Cardinal Ritter’s
actions.16 They applauded his courageous declaration and

implored him not to let segregationists change his mind.
One approving citizen wrote, “it is difficult to see how the
Church’s mission to men of all races and nationalities can
be fulfilled in the United States without some bold action
such as your own.”17
Those who disapproved also sent emotional letters.
They cited many reasons—personal, economic, political,
and racial—for disapproving of the Cardinal’s actions.
They expressed outrage that stemmed from fears of
miscegenation, worry that black people had bad odor,
frustration that the money white Catholics donated to the
Archdiocese was being used to help undeserving blacks,
and a belief that Cardinal Ritter’s unilateral action was
reminiscent of Hitler’s totalitarianism. Some stated that
they refused to send their children to integrated institutions
and intended to transfer their children to other schools,
with one individual stating, “all I can say is thank God
for our Public Schools.”18 Still others referred to the city’s
southern connections, explaining to the Cardinal that “St.
Louis has always been a pro-Southern city, and I think we
have handled the racial problem to our advantage, so why
should the Catholic Church be the first to initiate such a
drastic flaw?”19 One woman even claimed she no longer

St. Mark’s Church quickly became a large and prominent Catholic congregation by the start of
the twentieth century. This building at Page and Academy avenues, designed by the prominent
architectural firm of Barnett, Haynes, and Barnett, was completed in 1902. The school was nearby.
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)
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Completed in 1909, Soldan High School originally
educated a wealthy and predominantly Jewish student body
until the 1950s. It was named for Frank Louis Soldan,
superintendent of St. Louis Public Schools who had died the
previous year. It is one of several in St. Louis designed by
William B. Ittner, who designed schools in new ways starting
in the early twentieth century with increased attention to the
needs of students and new learning theory. Today, it is the
Soldan International Studies High School.

wanted to be Catholic.20 The reasoning in the disapproving
letters ranged from desires to maintain the status quo to
overt racial hatred.
It is impossible to tell whether the majority of St. Louis’s
Catholic population approved or disapproved of Catholic
school integration solely by analyzing letters sent to
Cardinal Ritter. Comparing the number of supportive and
opposing letters sent does little good because many people
who personally disapproved of the Cardinal’s actions
were probably unwilling to voice their dissenting opinions
directly to the Cardinal. What is clear, though, is that
many Catholics in St. Louis were deeply disconcerted by
the contradictions between their personal racial views and
their Cardinal’s liberalism. Other pieces of evidence from
the months and years after Cardinal Ritter’s announcement
provide clues to how the community adjusted to integrated
Catholic schools, as well as to increasing numbers of
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blacks in previously all-white neighborhoods. For the
most part Catholic St. Louisans, like the majority of the
city, acted as passive liberals who accepted the reality
of desegregated institutions due to Cardinal Ritter’s
liberal activism, but were also unwilling to risk the
respectability of their city to fight for segregated schools
and neighborhoods.
Even if a significant number of Catholics disliked
Cardinal Ritter’s racial policies, most limited their
complaints to friends and family. Dan Kelley, a West
End resident who was ten years old at the time of the
integration, explained that his parents were very upset with
the Cardinal’s decision, though they, like most Catholics,
did not engage in any protest against the decision. Kelley
recalled, “people talked about it at church” and worried
that “everything was going to go to hell in a hand basket.”
In the end, though, he explained that while many disagreed
with the decision, “they accommodated it.”21 This passive
acceptance of Catholic school desegregation and the
Cardinal’s liberal race policies opened an opportunity for
Catholic leaders to be optimistic about the possibility of
fostering interracial parishes. However, the ambivalent
nature of the Catholic community’s commitment to
integration ultimately did very little to sustain integration
in the West End.
The most salient example of short-lived but direct
opposition to Cardinal Ritter’s school integration was a
St. Elizabeth’s was an African-American Catholic Church
in the 1940s; most of its parishioners sent their children to
the segregated St. Joseph’s Colored High School. In the
undated first communion photo from St. Elizabeth’s, note
the white nun on the left. (Images: Archdiocese of St. Louis
Archives)

group of over eight hundred Catholics who formed an
organization to block Catholic school desegregation.
The Catholic Parents Association of St. Louis and
St. Louis County threatened to sue the Cardinal for
forcing integration. Just weeks after its creation, the
group reluctantly disbanded after Cardinal Ritter
announced that anyone opposing the integration would
be excommunicated. During the emotionally charged
final meeting of the Catholic Parents Association, group
leader John Barrett pleaded with the crowd to rescind its
legal threats against the Cardinal and disband the group.
On the verge of tears and “in a state of near collapse,”
he announced, “the only alternative we can now have to
disbanding this group is to turn on our Archbishop and
our faith. I am not going to do that. We cannot scandalize
our Catholic religion and oppose our Archbishop without
getting into sin. The only way we could carry on after
this, is to throw up our Catholic religion.”22 Barrett “wept
openly” as he put forth a motion to disband the group. The
motion was met with loud booing from the crowd, and
one man even grabbed the microphone and shouted that
Catholic parents should transfer their children to public
schools in protest. Even though the meeting was emotional
and chaotic, only fifty people voted against disbanding the
group. After announcing that the motion to disband had
passed, “Barrett was so overcome that he blindly left the
platform and, hardly able to walk, [had to be] escorted to
his car.”23
Though several individuals voiced their continued
dissatisfaction with Catholic school integration, the
Catholic Parents Association was defunct. This event
indicates two important points. First, when forced
to choose, St. Louis Catholics who opposed school
integration chose their religious views over their racial
views. Second, and equally important, while these
Catholics ceased fighting school integration, they did
not have to accept an integrated community. As became
apparent through housing choices, Catholics often moved
out of parishes that were integrating. The short-lived
existence of the Catholic Parents Association, while
ultimately unsuccessful in their goal of blocking Catholic
school integration, certainly demonstrated that many
St. Louis Catholics were unwilling to support Cardinal
Ritter’s liberal race policies.
While the Catholic Parents Association was the most
vocal instance of opposition to integrated Catholic schools,
some parents did indeed remove students from Catholic
schools that enrolled black students. For example, the allgirls Rosati-Kain High School, which drew a significant
number of students from West End parishes, enrolled
five black students for the 1947–1948 school year.24 As a
result, “about thirty girls who had previously registered,
on learning of the acceptance of five colored girls, sought
entrance to other Catholic High Schools, and a few
to Public High Schools.”25 In subsequent years, black
enrollment increased to over one hundred pupils, about 20
percent of the school population by 1954.26 While some
parents chose to actively resist integration through school
choice, the majority kept their children in Catholic schools.

Not all Catholics supported Ritter’s efforts to end segregation
in parochial schools, as this handbill from 1947 suggests.
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)

Even though most St. Louis Catholics were willing to
tolerate desegregated religious education, the same could
not be said for integrated neighborhoods. Archdiocese
concerns and parish population patterns in the racially
transitioning West End show clearly that the vast majority
of white Catholics were unwilling to live in integrated
city neighborhoods; by the late 1960s, St. Rose Parish in
the West End only served about two hundred Catholics.27
In a letter to parish priests, Cardinal Ritter specifically
asked if priests would volunteer to be assigned to a racially
transitioning parish, saying, “I realize this is an unusual
request, but these are unusual times.”28 Clearly, leaders of
Catholic institutions understood the necessity of making
special efforts to foster stable, integrated neighborhoods
that would be acceptable to both blacks and whites.
The history of the West End’s St. Rose of Lima Parish,
established in 1884 and closed in 1992, shows how
racial demographics affected Catholics in this north city
neighborhood. The parish flourished in the first half of the
twentieth century. It shifted from a small rural community
outside the city limits to serving an increasingly urban
population, boasting a handsome building dedicated in
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On May 4, 1949, students at Washington University in St.
Louis held a rally to gain admission for African-Americans
at the university. (Image: Washington University Special
Collections)

1910, a variety of church clubs, and several Catholic
institutions, including a maternity hospital and a girls’
technical school. The parish also ran St. Rose of Lima
School, with an enrollment of over four hundred students.29
In recounting the history of St. Rose of Lima from
1934–1984, the parish history explains: “To tell the story
of St. Rose Parish… is to tell the story of a neighborhood
because Catholic parishes are based in neighborhoods. …
[I]n many parishes the people who celebrate the centennial
are grandchildren of the men and women who celebrated
the golden jubilee. At St. Rose’s, however, that is not
the case. There are . . . few such people tied to those
earlier ones.”30 The history chronicles the racial transition
of the West End parish. As a small number of black
Catholics moved into the West End, they experienced a
moderate degree of discrimination, but the St. Rose of
Lima Parish history asserts that many white parishioners
were welcoming. St. Rose School activities were open
to students regardless of race. One parishioner, Mrs.
Anson, “took it as her personal ministry to welcome Black
women and make them part of any activity.”31 The first
years of integration, both according to the parish history
as well as St. Rose student Dan Kelley, passed relatively
uneventfully. Kelley remembers that African American
students started attending St. Rose Parish elementary
school without incident in the late forties, saying “they just
started to show up, and it just wasn’t a big issue.”32 The
parish history says that racial transition increased sharply
as federal urban renewal projects demolished hundreds
of residences in traditionally black neighborhoods. Many
of these new West End residents rented apartments from
large, subdivided houses in the neighborhood. St. Rose’s
Father Clohessy made some efforts to convert blacks, but
his proselytizing produced few converts. By 1962, only 14
of St. Rose School’s 450 children were white, and many of
the new black students were not Catholic.33
Even though the official history of St. Rose highlights
the positive aspects of the parish’s racial history, the
account also reveals white Catholics’ struggles to reconcile
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the church’s call to integrate and personal discomfort
with racial mixing. Even Father Clohssey demonstrated
ambivalence in the face of the changing character of the
parish. The history explains that he was “uncomfortable
with all the changes” occurring in the parish in the late
1950s and early 1960s.34 The history repeatedly mentions
parishioners’ worries about the neighborhood’s racial
change, heavily implying that an influx of blacks was a
main reason whites were moving out of the neighborhood.
Despite the commitment of Catholic institutions and some
parishioners to integrated neighborhoods and schools,
in the space of about ten years, the West End’s Catholic
and non-Catholic population shifted from all-white to
temporarily integrated to almost exclusively black.
By 1963, St. Rose’s new pastor understood he was
the leader of a black parish, so in 1964, St. Rose hosted
a meeting of priests to “study the problems of a Black
parish.”35 St. Rose Parish, though, could not maintain a
sustainable number of black parishioners; by 1967, the
parish only had about two hundred members.36 In 1992,
St. Rose and five other north city parishes combined due
to low population. Despite Cardinal Ritter’s commitment
to integrated education, by the 1960s parishes in the West
End were focused on maintaining black, not interracial,
parishes. The history of St. Rose Parish reveals that
attempts in the fifties to foster an interracial parish as
well as an integrated neighborhood were ultimately
unsuccessful. As was typical for St. Louis race relations,
parishioners limited overt opposition to Cardinal Ritter’s
desegregation, but their residential patterns simultaneously
shifted to sustain segregated living patterns. Liberal
church leaders were unable to use their moral authority
to overcome parishioners’ deep-seated fears—racial,
economic, and social—of living among blacks. Because
most St. Louis Catholics were committed to their faith,
not to actively pursuing racial equality, church leadership
could not compel Catholic residents to continue living in
the area and welcome blacks into their neighborhood.
Jews also migrated out of the city in the decades
following World War II—and they often did so earlier than
Catholics—but their reasoning diverged in important ways.
Unlike Catholic parishes that are geographically bounded,
synagogues are free to uproot and move in response to
population shifts. As a result, most Jewish institutions in
St. Louis actively sought to move locations in anticipation
of population shifts, and almost every West End Jewish
congregation moved outside the city limits by the 1960s.
Some Jews, often affiliated with Jewish organizations, tried
to maintain their neighborhoods and convince other whites
to remain. They allied with civil rights organizations and
created community groups to address the challenges of
stabilizing neighborhoods undergoing racial transition.
Despite their efforts, though, these actively liberal Jews
could not stem the flow of their peers into the county,
and by about 1960 the neighborhood that had once been
the center of the St. Louis Jewish community was almost
exclusively black.
While St. Louis’s Jewish community has always been
small in comparison with the total population (about 6

In the 1940s, Soldan High School included a sizable Jewish population integrated into the student body, such as this group
at the 1949 graduation party. (Image: St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)

percent of the city’s population in the early 1900s), Jews
still profoundly influenced the city and the West End
neighborhood in particular. Historian Walter Ehrlich
chronicles St. Louis’s Jewish population in his two-volume
work, Zion in the Valley. The first documentation of Jews
in the city dates to the early 1800s, and a handful of Jewish
institutions arose throughout the mid-1800s. Increased
Jewish immigration from Europe to St. Louis mirrored
national immigration patterns of the turn of the twentieth
century. By 1900, the majority of St. Louis Jews had
settled in the “Ghetto,” located north of downtown and
west to Ninth Street. As the population grew, the city’s
Jewish area expanded west toward Jefferson Avenue.37
While most Jews were concentrated in this space, the area
was also home to a variety of working-class newcomers,
including blacks migrating from the South as well as
Irish, Italian, and Polish immigrants, many of whom were
Catholic.38 By the 1920s, the upwardly mobile Jewish
population had shifted further west from the Mississippi
River, settling in the West End, and most synagogues
transferred to new West End locations to better serve

their congregants. For the next thirty years, the Jewish
community flourished in the West End.
A variety of West End institutions served the Jewish
population. As most Jewish children attended public
schools, Soldan High School became a source of pride
for the Jewish community and hosted liberal interfaith
and interracial events. For example, in 1941 the school
held a Youth and Democracy Rally, which Catholics,
Protestants, Jews, blacks, and whites attended.39 While
Jews were never the majority religion in either the West
End or at Soldan, the school still offered a full program
of Jewish classes, as well as an active Hebrew Club.40
Jewish Soldan graduates of the 1940s discuss their alma
mater very fondly. Anabelle Chapel remembered, “Soldan
I really loved. Those were some of the finest days of my
youth. It was a very good school.”41 Similarly, Harvey
Brown, who graduated from Soldan in 1944, recalled that
“Soldan was a great city school.”42 Several alumni who
graduated in the 1940s particularly remember the school’s
outstanding English department. From both a social and
academic perspective, Soldan graduates from the 1940s
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on the corner of Union and Enright, about two blocks
from Soldan and in the heart of the West End. For three
decades, this location provided a wide range of services
to both Jewish and non-Jewish community members. The
YMHA’s newsletter boasted about expanded facilities and
opportunities available to members, including a library,
game room, auditorium, swimming pool, handball courts,
gym, billiard hall, and roof garden.43 Among various
athletic teams, social clubs, and educational programs,
the YMHA’s Liberal Forums stood out as a highlight of

On May 4, 1949, students at Washington University in St.
Louis held a rally to gain admission for African-Americans
at the university. (Image: Washington University Special
Collections)

were extremely complimentary of their school.
In addition to over a dozen houses of worship, the
Young Men’s/Women’s Hebrew Association (YMHA)
was another important institution for the West End Jewish
community. Established in the late 1800s as a men’s
literary club, the organization expanded in the first half of
the twentieth century to become one of the most important
Jewish community institutions in the city. The YMHA
bounced from location to location in the first two decades
of the twentieth century. Under the leadership of executive
director Gilbert Harris, the YMHA purchased land to
construct a Jewish community center that opened in 1927
A native St. Louisan, Gilbert Harris (seated second from left)
returned to the city in 1922 to become executive director
of the YMHA/YWMA in St. Louis after working for the
National Jewish Welfare Board in New York. The YMHA/
YWHA building at Union and Enright, built in 1927, was
among his fundraising accomplishments. (Image: Gilbert
Harris Collection, St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)
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The Young Men’s Hebrew Association (YMHA) was a
key part of the Jewish cultural life by the 1940s. The first
YMHA was founded in Baltimore in 1854 to assist Jewish
immigrants; a branch opened in St. Louis in 1880. An
affiliated arm of it, the Young Women’s Hebrew Association
(YWHA), was founded in 1888 in New York; the first
independent YWHA chapter appeared in 1902. Later
in the twentieth century, they evolved into today’s Jewish
Community Center (JCC), offering an array of activities and
classes, as this catalogue from 1947–1948 suggests. The
YMHA/YWHA was at Union and Enright in the West End
when the cover photo was taken. (Image: St. Louis Jewish
Community Archives)

YMHA activities. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the
Liberal Forum sponsored talks by prominent figures,
including Eleanor Roosevelt, Clarence Darrow, and Walter
White.44 YMHA regulars remember Harris’s prominent
presence at the YMHA. Hans Mayer, who moved to St.
Louis as a child, explained that Harris was a “highly
visible” director who always made sure to be present when
children left for and returned from summer camp.45
Soldan High School’s experience with school
desegregation demonstrated the limited extent of what
the West End’s Jewish and secular passive liberalism
could achieve. Even though Catholic schools integrated
in 1947, it was not until the 1954 Brown v. Board decision
that public schools in St. Louis adopted a desegregation
plan. Because by this time the city’s Catholic schools had
desegregated, the passive liberal majority understood the
inevitability of desegregation and therefore supported
its implementation. Again, unlike in communities across
the South, St. Louis’s integration plan was carried out on
time and with little controversy. Some St. Louis schools,
especially those in mostly white south city, would not
experience a significant influx of black students in the
early years of desegregated education. The heavily Jewish
Ha Ivria was the Hebrew Cultural Center at Soldan High
School. When this picture for the Soldan yearbook
appeared, Ha Ivria had some 40 members. (Image: St. Louis
Jewish Community Archives)

Soldan High School, on the other hand, absorbed more
blacks than any other high school in the city.46 All accounts
of integration at Soldan in 1955 indicate overwhelming
success in both planning and implementation. In
anticipation of the integration, Soldan held a meeting at
which parents could ask questions and make suggestions
about easing the transition, and there is no record of
dissent at this meeting.47 Soldan’s new principal, Stanley
Hill, connected the process of integration to the reputation
of the West End, stating that “the good name of the
neighborhood as well as the city was at stake in avoiding
incidents such as those in Baltimore and Washington.”48
To prepare for the new students, transferees met with
faculty advisors and registered for classes the week before
integration took place. The first integrated meeting of
the Soldan-Blewett Parents’ Association had about two
hundred attendees, many of whom were black.49
On February 1, 1955, the day St. Louis high schools
integrated, Soldan absorbed 375 black students, increasing
the school’s enrollment to 1,350. Speaking three days after
integration occurred in city high schools, Superintendent
Hickey announced, “I cannot speak highly enough of the
manner in which our high school boys and girls of both
races have accepted this step. . . . [T]he striking thing to
me is the positive, rather passive, acceptance of the change
by the student groups.”50 The black press’s evaluation of
Soldan’s integration was very similar to that of other city
newspapers, explaining, “observation of passing in the
corridors and classroom sessions gave no indication that
anything out of the ordinary had occurred.”51 Soldan’s
students took pride in the orderly and civilized manner of
their school’s integration. In both 1955 and 1956, students
dedicated their yearbook to their school administrators and
commended the manner in which integration occurred. The
yearbook editors claimed, “[T]his new administration has
handled the job of integration with skill and intelligence
and has made Soldan-Blewett the best integrated school in
St. Louis.”52 An analysis of yearbook photographs reveals
that black students participated actively in Soldan’s clubs
and sports.53
Jake Leventhal and Linda Kraus, two Jewish students
who attended Soldan when it desegregated, have similar
memories of the first year of integration. Neither has
recollections of race-based incidents, and Leventhal called
the integration process “seamless.” Kraus continued her
participation in integrated extra-curricular activities,
including the yearbook, newspaper, and cheerleading, and
she believed that the integration went as well as it could.
Neither remembers the school explicitly preparing students
for the integration, other than assigning students to new
advisors to make sure that each class had a mix of black
and white students. As an athlete, Leventhal remembers
Vice Principal Otto Rost visiting his integrated football
team during a summer practice and specifically instructing
the players to “be mixed up” racially the next time he
came to check on them. Leventhal discussed his time at
the integrated Soldan fondly, explaining that the school’s
athletic teams served as a role model for interracial
cooperation for the entire school.54
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By all accounts the integration had been implemented
successfully, as evidenced by an almost complete lack of
controversy, as well as outward community enthusiasm.
The initial success of Soldan’s integration was due to
passive liberalism: West End residents understood that
segregated education was no longer socially acceptable, so
the community rallied behind a smooth school integration
in the wake of Brown. The amount of public support given
to the desegregation process made St. Louisans optimistic
that their racial liberalism would foster a progressive and
democratic city. Citizens believed that St. Louis was in
a prime position to handle interracial urban education
without violence or controversy, and the confident tone of
the black press was similar to that of other newspapers.
In an article published a few days after the high schools’
integration, an Argus article asserted, “[T]he cooperation
of all concerned up to this point is assurance enough
that St. Louis is foremost among American cities willing
to advance democracy in deeds.”55 A large and widely
publicized segment of the city welcomed integrated
Ritter issued this statement to support the announced
desegregation of St. Louis Public Schools in the aftermath
of the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954.
Ritter instructed that “This letter to be read at all Masses on
Sunday, June 27, 1954.” (Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis
Archives)

56 | The Confluence | Spring/Summer 2015

schooling due to liberalism’s commitment to racial
equality.
It took only a few years, however, for attentive citizens
to realize how fleeting this success was, and when faced
with the reality that integration might require difficult
personal decisions about where to live and educate
their children, passive liberals turned their backs on
integration. In a 1959 statement to the Urban League
Board of Directors, St. Louis branch executive director
Leo Bohanon proclaimed, “[A]bout two years ago the first
complaints alleging a breakdown in school desegregation
came to the attention of the Urban League. Charges were
made that the school administration was permitting Clark
grade and Soldan High schools to become all Negro
schools in pupils and teachers.” He goes on to state,
“[T]here is a growing feeling that both the public school
administration and the Board of Education have adopted
a laissez faire attitude toward public school integration,
which borders on indifference” [strikethrough original].56
He also provided a list of accusations, which included
busing white students to white schools and overcrowding
at predominantly black schools. Clearly, the Urban League
and other civil rights organizations believed passivity and
indifference were unacceptable.
Further, African American City Alderman William
Lacy Clay (who would later represent St. Louis in the
United States House of Representatives) charged that
“the St. Louis Board of Education and the Department of
Instruction have been guilty of either a premeditated and
intentional program to cause and allow the increase of
segregation in the schools or at the very least have adopted
policies that have been conducive to the re-segregation of
the school system.”57 He noted that Soldan was 99 percent
black, while the neighborhood was 50 percent white; this
meant that 1,700 white students who should have been
attending Soldan were being educated in white public
schools.58 Jake Leventhal explained that one year after he
graduated from Soldan, his parents moved out of the city
despite the financial hardship this imposed because his
sister had been the only white student in her elementary
school class.59
To understand why and how St. Louis school integration
failed, it is necessary to analyze conversations surrounding
residential choices. West End residents, both those merely
looking for an attractive place to live as well as individuals
who touted themselves as racially liberal, were ultimately
unwilling to collectively invest in the continued integration
and middle-class status of the West End. By analyzing
housing choices and changes in Jewish institutions’
locations, the limits of St. Louis’s passive and active
liberalism become apparent. Despite the fact that city
residents were mostly in agreement regarding the need to
end formal segregation, citizens were largely unwilling to
sustain this commitment to desegregation through housing
choices.
While Gilbert Harris was proud of the ways the
YMHA building on Union Boulevard served the West
End community, Harris’s goal, like those of the West
End’s synagogues, was for Jewish institutions to follow

Jewish population trends, not to shape them. The YMHA’s
commitment to following Jewish population patterns led
to complex and contradictory statements and policies
regarding Jews’ residential choices and their role in
fostering integrated neighborhoods. As it became apparent
by the late forties that Jews were increasingly choosing
to live west of the city limits, by 1950 Harris advocated
heavily for the YMHA to move out of the city, despite the
fact that a significant number of Jews remained in the West
End into the mid-1950s. Therefore, Jewish institutions’
movement out of the city cannot simply be attributed
to attractions of suburban living; predictions of future
population trends were based on racialized assumptions
that upwardly mobile Jews would not live among blacks.
A 1947 YMHA program needs survey provides insight
into both the state of the West End neighborhood and the
Jewish community’s future in it, and its recommendations
reveal deep problems with passive liberalism. In 1947,
the survey stated, about one-half of St. Louis’s Jewish
population resided outside city limits, with a high
concentration in University City, a municipality directly
bordering the West End. With this information, the authors
believed that the city’s Jewish population would soon be
concentrated west of the city limits. Taking this impending
population shift into account, the report predicted that the
Union Boulevard YMHA building would only continue
to be an adequate location for another ten to fifteen years,
as long as satellite programs were created to reach Jews
outside the city.
While this report provided a large amount of
demographic information about the region’s Jewish
population, its references to neighboring black populations
provide a fascinating window into Jews’ feelings about
the possibility of integrated neighborhoods. Published
before the Shelley v. Kraemer decision, this report
indicates that Jewish institutional leaders assumed blacks
would eventually move into the West End. Even before
the demise of racially restrictive housing covenants, the
report correctly predicted that blacks would soon reside
in areas of the West End that were primarily comprised
of rental properties. Though the report does not explicitly
label this impending trend as negative, the writers were
uneasy about the effects blacks would have in the West
End. The fact that blacks were the only non-Jewish group
referenced in the report indicates that the authors drew
a direct connection between migration of blacks into
the West End and the neighborhood’s decline in Jewish
population. This connection was a thinly veiled admission
that, regardless of widespread support for the ideal of
integration, the authors assumed most Jews did not want
to live in a racially integrated neighborhood. The report
stated that when blacks began to move into the West
End, “Union Avenue from Delmar to Page will probably
remain a [Jewish] civic center area for a period of about 15
years.”60 The report had racial overtones without making
any explicit race-based recommendations. When blacks,
as predicted, did begin migrating into the West End, the
YMHA’s, as well as the Jewish community’s, responses
were simultaneously welcoming and wary. Some Jews

actively welcomed the transitioning neighborhood’s
interracial character, and the YMHA provided a number of
interracial programs, indicating the institution’s acceptance
of blacks in the neighborhood. However, even as Jews
accepted the concept of integration, most did not believe
it was their personal responsibility to foster integration
through housing choices.
YMHA Executive Director Gilbert Harris’s statements
regarding neighborhood racial transition were dizzyingly
contradictory, and these inconsistencies demonstrated the
genuine ambivalence he and many other passively liberal
residents likely felt regarding how to interpret changes in
the West End and Jewish institutions’ role in shaping those
changes. “Our Neighborhood,” a speech Harris delivered
seven years after the program needs survey recommended
moving the YMHA to the suburbs, clearly illustrated his
confusion. In one section of the speech, he stated:
The [West End] which once was an area of home
owners . . . is now characterized as a neighborhood
of transients and lower economic groups. I make this
statement objectively and without any lament for
the good old days. Every American city and every
American neighborhood seems to go through its
years of youth, maturity and decline. . . . Today there
are some communities that are concerned with the
conservation process of neighborhoods and are doing
something about it, and hopefully in the future more
neighborhoods will continue to be zealous to maintain
their character. In giving these facts I do not speak
disparagingly of any people. All peoples need housing
and we know that as their economic status improves,
their social acceptability advances too.61
Several key paradoxes were present in Harris’s thinking,
and these complexities reveal the limitations of passive
liberals’ thought and action on race issues. First, Harris
simultaneously identified with the West End but also
showed willingness to abandon the neighborhood for the
sake of economic opportunity in the suburbs. Second, he
provided only lukewarm evaluations of efforts to conserve
the character of transitioning neighborhoods, despite the
fact that the YMHA sometimes served as a meeting place
for the religious and secular organizations that championed
integration. Third, he portrayed neighborhood change as
inevitable, again, despite the fact that the YMHA hosted
organizations firmly committed to halting neighborhood
deterioration through maintenance of integration. Harris
seemed in favor of neighborhood conservation efforts
in theory, but as a Jewish community leader, he was
unwilling to participate in them actively or to make the
YMHA building a symbol of Jewish commitment to West
End neighborhood integration.
Later in this same speech, he made the following
comments:
Those of us who live in our neighborhood like it
and want to improve it in whatever way we can.
Unfortunately, there are not enough people who are
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energetic enough to do the job. . . . They were full of
venom about having to leave the neighborhood and to
suffer financial losses in selling their homes, and were
very cynical about the newcomers. … As one who has
lived most of his life in the general neighborhood, and
who looks forward to many more years there, I am
anxious to see the neighborhood maintain itself. It has
many advantages—cultural, spiritual, and geographic.
I know there are those who share the same point
of view and with their help we hope that our
neighborhood will continue to be a fine and interesting
place in which to live.62
Here again, Harris’ contradictions were glaring. He
concurrently assumed that whites would abandon the
neighborhood, expressed whites’ anger at the declining
status of the neighborhood, and also stated that he intended
to continue living in the West End. The very belief that
property values would fall simply due to blacks’ presence
in a neighborhood shows whites’ racial fears. Because the
fear of declined economic status was tied to integrated
neighborhoods, financial interest easily trumped passive
liberal ideology. While it is unclear whether Harris was
conscious of all these contradictions, their presence in a
public speech indicated that Harris himself wrestled with
his understanding of changes in the West End. There were
certainly racist qualities to his statements, yet his ideas do
not seem hateful. Rather, he was demonstrating a genuine
attempt to process the rapid societal changes occurring
around him, attempts that West End residents were likely
also grappling with.
In a speech a few months later, Harris made
a fascinating comment about the importance of
neighborhood institutions, saying, “institutions uphold
property values. Would Union Boulevard have remained
the street it is today, with the various institutions
located in that area, or would it have held up better with
residences?”63 He attributed the West End’s success to
the existence of institutions (religious as well as secular),
yet he advocated for pulling the YMHA out of the West
End for the sake of Jewish progress in the suburbs.64 The
decision to move the YMHA into West County mirrored
the decisions of synagogues. Congregation B’Nai
Amoona, for example, began searching for a new location
almost immediately after purchasing a property in the
West End.65 For Harris, like most liberal Jews, opportunity
for economic upward mobility in the suburbs or fears of
declining financially trumped opportunities to maintain
the status of a cherished neighborhood. If Gilbert Harris
was an accurate representation of liberal Jews’ conflicted
feelings on integration and neighborhood change, it is no
surprise that efforts to maintain neighborhood integration
failed miserably. Liberal individuals were unable to see the
racist assumptions underlying the belief that integration
would necessarily lead to decreased property values, so
St. Louisans’ liberal ideology could not be a vehicle for
realizing integration in the West End.
Even though some St. Louis Jewish leaders were in
the vanguard of advocating for integrated schools and
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neighborhoods, their active liberalism could not convince
passively liberal counterparts to remain in an integrating
community. These actively liberal Jews, like counterparts
in other cities, believed their decisions on where to live
and educate their children could play a role in creating
stable, desirable, and integrated urban neighborhoods. To
achieve a desirable integrated neighborhood, community
activists would have to work against ambivalence
regarding individuals’ personal roles in maintaining the
integrated, middle-class character of the West End. It
would only be possible to sustain integration through
explicit claims that the West End could maintain its
desirable character, convincing white residents they should
not sell their properties.
During the brief time that St. Louis’s public school
desegregation generally and Soldan’s integration
specifically seemed to be working as planned, religious
and secular organizations committed themselves to making
the West End a model of a successful, integrated, and
stable middle-class neighborhood. The Jewish Community
Relations Council (JCRC) was in the vanguard of
these efforts. Through the leadership of St. Louis
branch Executive Director Myron Schwartz, the JCRC
provided active leadership in a variety of neighborhood
improvement efforts and collaborated frequently with
the Urban League as well as various neighborhoodbased organizations. Schwartz corresponded frequently
with other cities’ JCRC leaders to understand how other
city neighborhoods were dealing with neighborhood
racial transition. JCRC leaders across the urban North
understood neighborhood change as a democratic issue.
A draft of a JCRC guide for changing neighborhoods
explained, “[T]he contradictions between our democratic
principles and our actual practices cannot help but arouse
suspicion, cynicism and distrust, both among our own
citizens and our watchful allies.”66 Clearly, a cohort of
Jewish leaders understood that vocalizing integrationist
rhetoric amidst a mass exodus into the suburbs would
not promote racial equality. Maintaining integrated
neighborhoods would require active decisions by Jews
to remain rooted in urban neighborhoods in the face of
speculation and panic.
However, as historian Lila Berman has indicated
and the St. Louis experience demonstrated, most urban
Jews were unwilling to base housing decisions on the
possibility of maintaining integration. Even the national
JCRC report’s recommendations did not include calls to
sustain residences in transitioning neighborhoods; instead,
it suggested what Berman termed “remote urbanism”:
population studies, education, and political activism to
increase access to non-discriminatory housing, allowing
Jews to devote charitable funds to urban areas while
simultaneously moving out of them.67 Remote urbanism,
though, was an acceptance of passive liberalism, because it
allowed people to believe they could support urban issues
while concurrently disinvesting in cities by moving to the
suburbs. The JCRC report therefore fell into the trap it
cautioned leaders to avoid: the report wanted to support
urban neighborhoods through rhetoric and charity, but it

did not call for Jews to make their housing choices based
on an ideal of integrated communities. Most passive liberal
Jews believed they could further racial equality verbally
and politically while making personal choices to move into
racially homogenous suburbs. Myron Schwartz, the St.
Louis JCRC branch, and other neighborhood organizations
attempted a more active role in maintaining integrated
living space through alliances with local organizations,
but these efforts proved unsustainable because most white
West End residents were unwilling to let a desire for
neighborhood integration dictate personal choices of where
to live. Therefore, many attempts to be actively liberal
quickly became passive, as Jewish organizations were
largely unwilling to ask Jews to make housing choices
based on a commitment to racial equality.
Starting in 1953, two interracial and actively liberal
West End organizations, first the Union Boulevard
Association (UBA) and later the West End Community
Conference (WECC), attempted to craft a stable, middleclass, desirable, and integrated neighborhood. Their efforts
and shortcomings demonstrate difficulties active liberals
confronted in the face of a passively liberal majority. That
year, the UBA conducted a small survey of thirty-seven
West End residents to understand how people perceived
changes within the neighborhood. Many white respondents
believed that they lived in an ideal location, but they also
cited racially coded reasons for wanting to move out,
including “crowding, dirt, [and] noise,” as well as some
explicit discomfort with proximity to blacks.68
The most creative UBA campaign involved decreasing
blight in the blocks surrounding Soldan High School.
To stabilize areas of the neighborhood that were
deteriorating and maintain property values, a group of
residents requested urban renewal funding from the
city government to study zoning violations and build
parks and playgrounds. The press lauded these efforts,
claiming, “Residents of the Soldan-Blewett High School
neighborhood set a fine example with their proposal
to organize a conservation and improvement program
before it is too late. . . . Here is planning at its best—city
planning with a strong base of neighborhood interest and
initiative.”69 In order to receive federal funding, West End
residents had to request that areas of their neighborhood
be labeled “blighted,” so that they would be eligible for
urban renewal money. Though federal urban renewal
programs—both nationally and in St. Louis—were largely
vilified by the mid-1960s because they were often used
to fund entrepreneurs’ interests over those of residents,
this instance of West End community members requesting
funding shows that in urban renewal’s early stages, St.
Louis residents were sometimes able to have an impact on
where and how federal funding was spent. Despite these
innovative, citizen-led efforts, the UBA had little lasting
impact on the West End. In fact, labeling sections of the
West End as blighted may have backfired because many
residents likely felt uneasy about living in spaces marked
as deteriorating. The UBA’s experimentation showed that
some West End residents were willing to work creatively
to maintain the status of their neighborhood.

While the UBA clearly wanted to improve the
neighborhood, it was the West End Community
Conference that more directly attempted to stave off white
flight. Formed in 1955, the WECC’s explicit goal was to
keep the West End a high quality, integrated neighborhood.
A flier advertising an April 1955 meeting explained,
“[M]any of us feel that this is a good neighborhood to live
in and want to see it preserved and improved. That’s why
over a hundred of us met recently to found . . . The West
End Community Conference.”70 By 1957, the WECC,
which served a 150-block area that was home to 25,000
residents, boasted 800 members. A 1957 St. Louis PostDispatch article detailing WECC work explained that the
its strategy for maintaining integration revolved around
stabilizing real estate prices by maintaining physical
neighborhood space and convincing residents to remain in
the neighborhood. The article attributed WECC successes
to the presence of liberal residents, claiming that “a vital
factor . . . was the presence in the area of an extraordinary
number of people of broadly liberal bent, accustomed
to leadership, unafraid of responsibility and fully aware
of how much might depend on the example they set.”71
West End resident Mrs. Carl Meyers typified this liberal
commitment to remaining in the neighborhood. She
explained, “[W]e deliberately chose to live here . . . we
like it simply because it isn’t homogeneous. In our block
there is a professor at Washington University, another
man rich enough to have a chauffeur, and a laborer.
We’re interested in people, and in finding the answer to
the question: Can people really change things, or does
nature take its course?”72 Clearly, a vocal, though probably
small, group of actively liberal residents was willing to
base their housing choices on maintaining an integrated
neighborhood.
The WECC enjoyed a positive reputation for its first
five years of existence. In reference to the WECC, a black
newspaper article stated, “[H]ere is a particular section
of a great city that has been justly held up as an example
of what can be done under our American democracy.”73
However, this idealistic view of the neighborhood was
incredibly tenuous, and a scandal within WECC leadership
illustrated the fragility of white racial liberalism in St.
Louis. In 1960, the WECC suddenly lost its positive
reputation as a liberal interracial organization due to an
incident involving a board member. Landlord and WECC
Vice-Chairman William Baggerman evicted a husband
and wife from his building upon learning that they were
an interracial couple. Baggerman claimed he evicted the
couple because they had “acted in bad faith by concealing
the fact of [the] wife’s race, [while] Negro members of the
WECC said Baggerman’s actions were motivated by racial
prejudice.”74 This incident exposed serious latent tensions
within the organization and undermined the interracial
harmony on which the WECC was predicated. In response
to this controversy, the WECC board voted on whether
to “pass judgment on William Baggerman’s behavior,”
and it was the first time in WECC history that a vote was
split down racial lines.75 Only one black woman voted
with the conference’s white members, stating she wanted
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to keep lines of communication open, while a single
white member, a Washington University dean, voted with
the conference’s African American leaders to condemn
Baggerman’s actions.
WECC members’ reactions to this controversy reveal
how quickly active liberal viewpoints cracked under
pressure. One frustrated white member exclaimed,
“[W]hy do you always want to rush things. You are trying
to go too fast. If you would just slow down maybe we
would work something out”; a black member responded,
“[W]e are not that kind of organization. This should never
have come up.”76 This interchange demonstrates a glaring
miscommunication between white and black WECC
members. White members embraced liberal race relations
when they provided a noncontroversial way to deal with
inevitable school and neighborhood integration that did not
require personal or economic sacrifice. When tested by a
controversy, though, white liberals retreated to passivity,
preferring not to “rush things.” This dialogue shows that
above all, white liberals in the West End, whether passive
or active, wanted to avoid upheaval. Here lies the ultimate
problem with liberalism in St. Louis: even if a number
of actively liberal individuals were willing to make their
housing choices based on a desire to foster an integrated
neighborhood, they could not accept that the process of
maintaining integration would sometimes be contentious
and uncomfortable. If the most actively liberal white
community members were asking blacks to “just slow
down,” it is no wonder that integration efforts quickly
faltered.
Media response to this incident was strong, indicating
how much stock community members had placed in the
WECC, and they quickly highlighted the limits of white
West Enders’ liberalism. One article explained that the
incident may be “the real test of whether the West End
Community Conference is a genuine democratic outgrowth
in our American way, or is only a façade for pretentious
half-believers.”77 The Argus, St. Louis’s black newspaper,
echoed these questions of whites’ sincerity, stating that
“the majority of the whites, we are sure, felt snug and
secure in the feeling that ‘we are among the enlightened
liberals of this day.’”78 To both black and white residents,
this incident revealed the tenuous nature of interracial
alliances in the West End, as well as the inability of
liberalism to maintain commitments to integration amidst a
contentious atmosphere.
Although the controversy did not cause the WECC to
disband, it was a crippling blow—a number of frustrated
members (mostly black) resigned, and records of WECC
activities after the scandal are infrequent. It is crucial to
note how quick newspapers were to highlight whites’
wavering commitment to full integration and liberalism,
in contrast to the notable lack of controversy in accounts
of the 1955 public school desegregation. By 1960, then,
both blacks and whites were skeptical of white liberal
commitments to racial equality. If the WECC could be
debilitated by one controversy, it is unsurprising that
efforts to maintain the interracial demographics of the
neighborhood failed. Because racial liberalism could
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so quickly unravel, it was only natural that West End
residents who were not politically active would be
unwilling to maintain integration through housing choices
that came with economic and social status risks. The
WECC controversy exemplified the fragility of St. Louis’s
liberal commitment to an interracial society.
The West End’s current segregation and decreased
economic status was largely due to the weaknesses of
American liberalism. In St. Louis, as well as throughout
the country, liberals were unable to sustain combining
the ideals of racial equality and middle-class economic
opportunity, and fleeting attempts to do so floundered
at the first signs of interracial contention. The methods
of the West End Community Conference demonstrated
that active liberals knew how to simultaneously promote
integration and middle class neighborhood status.
However, the organization’s history showed West Enders’
inability to fully commit to these methods, because passive
liberalism allowed people to espouse racially progressive
rhetoric while making housing decisions based on racial
fears. Fleeting successes like the smooth school integration
could not convince white liberals that it was worth
working through racial tension to create an integrated
and economically upwardly mobile urban neighborhood.
Instead, liberals used the excuse of pursuing economic
opportunity to abandon commitments to racial equality
and integration. Ultimately, white liberals in St. Louis
believed that a future of integrated neighborhoods, while a
commendable ideal, was not the best avenue to pursue the
economic and social status they desired.
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throughout his life. He and
James Fenimore Cooper were
the first American writers
to gain acclaim in Europe.
Irving’s interests compelled
him to write about a wide
array of topics including
biographies of George
Washington and Mohammad,
the Moors, and fifteenthcentury Spain. (Image: Library
of Congress)

64 | The Confluence | Spring/Summer 2015

Fine nut trees,
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house—look out
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over rich, level
traders think they
plain or prairie—
have met traces of
green near at
York’s crowd, on
hand—blue line
the Missouri.
at the horizon—
Returned
universal chirp
by another route
and spinning of
escorted by young
insects—fertility
Clark—ride thro
of country—grove
prarie—flowers—
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rear of the house—
etc.—pass by
beehives—dove
a noble farm—
cote—canoe—
every thing in
Genl arrives on
abundance—pass
horseback with
by a circle of
dogs—guns. His
Indian mounds—
grandson on a
on one of them
calico poney
Genl Ashley has
hallowing &
built his house
laughing—Genl on
so as to have the
horseback—gun
summit of it as a
on his shoulder—
terrace in the rear.
cur—house dog—
St. Louis—
bullying setter.
old rackety
Gov. Clark fine
gambling house—
healthy robust
noise of the cue
man—tall about
& and the billiard
50—perhaps
ball from morning
more—his hair,
till night—old
By the time Irving met William Clark (1770–1838), the former explorer had
originally light,
French
woman
gained a certain amount of fame. For a New Yorker like Irving, the presence
now grey—falling of slaves was particularly striking. It is clear from Irving’s account that Clark
accosting each
on his shoulders— crafted his narrative about York in the context of his views about slaves and
other in the street.
frank—
Friday Sept
African-Americans. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
intelligent—his son
14. Drive out
a cadet of W.P. now
with Judge Peck,
in the army—aid
Judge’s uncle, &
de camp to Genl Atkinson.
our party to Fort Jefferson to see Black Hawk—ride thro
Dinner plentiful—good—hut rustic—fried chicken,
open country—formerly forest—drive to Genl Atkinson’s
bacon and grouse, roast beef, roasted potatoes, tomatoes,
quarters.
excellent cakes, bread, butter, & c.
Black Hawk. old man upwards of 70 with aquiline
Gov. C. gives much excellent information concerning
nose—finely formed heard—organs of benevolence—his
Indians.
two sons—oldest a fine-looking young man—his brother
His slaves—set them free—one he placed at a ferry—
in law the prophet—the little Indian stables.
another on a farm, giving him land, horses, &c.—a third
They are all chained arms & ankles with cannon, but are
he gave a large wagon & team of 6 horses to ply between
allowed to walk about escorted by soldier.
Nashville and Richmond. They all repented & wanted to
Old French town nicknamed Vuide Poche—old French
come back.
settlers retain their dress, manners &c.—cared little for
The waggoner was York, the hero of the Missouri
two or three times a week to dance—very sober and
expedition & adviser of the Indians. He could not get
temperate tho gay—kept aloof from Americans but begin
up early enough in the mornng—his horses were ill
to intermarry with them.
kept—two died—the others grew poor. He sold them,
Black Hawk—had a skin of a black hawk in his hand &
was cheated—entered into service—fared ill. “Damn this
fanned himself with the tail.
freedom,” said York, “I have never had a happy day since
I got it.” He determined to go back to his old master—set

66 | The Confluence | Spring/Summer 2015

Black Hawk (1767–1838) was a famous Sauk born in northwestern Illinois. While the Sauk and Fox tribes had ceded their
Illinois lands in an 1804 treaty, they were permitted to use the region until the United States government wanted the land.
In the late 1820s, settlers began moving into the area, but Sauks under Black Hawk refused to evacuate the region. After
a confrontation in summer 1832 in which hundreds of Native Americans were killed at Bad Axe Creek, Black Hawk and
several other Sauk and Fox leaders were captured and imprisoned at Jefferson Barracks. After being transported to Fortress
Monroe, Black Hawk returned and told fellow natives that it was futile to resist the Americans since they were so numerous.
This image is from Thomas McKenney’s History of the Indian Tribes of North America. (Image: Missouri History Museum)

E N D N O T E S
1

Excerpt reprinted by permission of the University of Oklahoma Press.
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A U T H O R S

Daniel Gonzales earned his MA in Museum Studies from the University of Missouri-Saint
Louis in the Spring of 2010 as the E. Desmond Lee Fellow. Following graduation he worked in
museum education and exhibit development at the Missouri History Museum. In 2013, Daniel
took on the position of Museum Curator with the St. Louis County Parks system.

Quinta Scott is the author of The Mississippi: A Visual Biography. She is also the author of
Along Route 66: The Architecture of America’s Highway, a great read-aloud guidebook of the old
road. She is the photographer/author of Route 66: The Highway and Its People with Susan Croce
Kelly, and of The Eads Bridge: Photographic Essay by Quinta Scott; Historical Appraisal by
Howard S. Miller. She and her husband, Barrie, live in Waterloo, Illinois, close to the American
Bottom and the great Mississippi River Bluffs.

Andrew M. Cooperman earned a BA in History and International Relations from McKendree
College (now University) and an MA in History from the University of Toledo. He grew up
in Cahokia, and has spent the last thirteen years either working or volunteering at the Cahokia
Courthouse State Historic Sites Complex. He is the author of “Cahokia’s Territorial Post
Office” (Journal of St. Clair County History, Vol. 33, 2004) and “Legal Landmarks” (St. Louis
Magazine, February, 2012). He is currently working on a display panel recounting the history of
slavery in Illinois for Cahokia’s Jarrot Mansion State Historic Site.
Sarah Siegel is a second-year history PhD student at Washington University in St. Louis. She
studies mid-twentieth century urban history, with a focus on community activism. She holds a
BA in History from Yale University and a MA in Secondary Education from the University of
Missouri-St. Louis. Before beginning her graduate research, she was a social studies teacher at
Soldan High School in St. Louis.
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Looking for more great articles
from The Confluence?
If you want more articles from The Confluence and
don’t want to wait for the new issue, you can order
past issues for half the price. You can get a preview
of what past issues contain online by going to
www.lindenwood.edu/confluence and viewing
the table of contents for each issue.
All past issues, including the special edition
Civil War issue, are only $6 each! A range of articles
discuss history, culture, science, architecture,
politics, and more. To order, simply fill out the
card on this page and return it in the enclosed
envelope, or order online at www.lindenwood.
edu/confluence.

To order from a mobile device simply scan
this code to be taken directly to
the Confluence website.
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Lindenwood University offers values-centered programs leading
to the development of the whole person – an educated, responsible
citizen of a global community.
Lindenwood is committed to
• providing an integrative liberal arts curriculum,
• offering professional and pre-professional degree programs,
• focusing on the talents, interests, and future of the student,
• supporting academic freedom and the unrestricted search
		for truth,
• affording cultural enrichment to the surrounding community,
• promoting ethical lifestyles,
• developing adaptive thinking and problem-solving skills,
• furthering lifelong learning.
Lindenwood is an independent, public-serving liberal arts
university that has a historical relationship with the Presbyterian
Church and is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian values. These
values include belief in an ordered, purposeful universe, the
dignity of work, the worth and integrity of the individual, the
obligations and privileges of citizenship, and the primacy of the
truth.

209 South Kingshighway
Saint Charles, MO 63301-1695
www.lindenwood.edu/confluence
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